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Executive Summary 
 
This study is an empirical and theoretical analysis of the influence obtained by the 
American oil industry in the United States decision to first sign and then not ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol.  The purpose of the study is to explore and measure the influence the 
industry managed to obtain and then compare the period before the signing to the 
period between the signing and the decision to not ratify Kyoto.  By employing 
theoretical framework, the empirical data collected will be analysed and variations in 
the influence dimension will be explored. 
 
The background for the study was the US decision to first formally sign the Kyoto 
Protocol and then approximately three years later decide to not ratify the Protocol.  
The international community assumed at the time that Kyoto would not survive 
without the participation of the US and therefore the US was subjected to international 
pressure to ratify the Protocol.  Nevertheless, the decision to not ratify Kyoto was 
made in March 2001, two months into the Presidency of George W. Bush. 
 
The study describes how the oil industry early on voiced its objections towards the 
Kyoto Protocol.  From the beginning, the American Petroleum Institute, the Global 
Climate Coalition and ExxonMobil chose a reactive strategy to make sure Kyoto was 
not ratified.  The industry claimed Kyoto was unfair due to the exclusion of 
developing countries and that it would prove to be costly for the industry as well as the 
American public.  The oil industry did not only object Kyoto but also argued the 
scientific consensus on climate change, claiming more research was needed to draw 
any conclusions.   
 
The analysis discuss the influence obtained by the industry on four different 
dimensions; political mobilisation, unity, financial resources and public opinion.  
Variations in the influence obtained in these variables are explored for both the first 
period before the signing in 1997 and the second period between the signing and the 
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decision not to ratify in 2001.  After analysing the data, the two phases are compared 
to see whether there are variations in influence in the two time frames. 
 
The analysis indicates that the oil industry was influential in the decision not to ratify 
the Kyoto Protocol.  In both periods the oil industry achieved access on the political 
decision making arena, first and foremost in the Senate and after 2001 also in the 
Administration.  They were successful in having the Byrd-Hagel resolution passed in 
the Senate, a resolution which made ratification of Kyoto difficult.  Though there were 
many actors involved in this resolution, there are indicators of strong lobbying from 
the oil industry that could have been decisive.  The unified position of the industry 
remained somewhat the same throughout the process, although some oil companies 
turned to a more proactive strategy after the signing of Kyoto.  That did not however 
appear to be consequential for the united approach from the oil industry against Kyoto.  
The financial resources enabled the industry to promote their views on Kyoto and 
climate change publicly as well as sponsor independent research and political 
campaigns.  The oil industry is one of the main sponsors of the Republican Party and 
gave substantial donations to George W. Bush presidential campaign in 2000.  The oil 
industry was however not able to convince the public opinion despite their media 
campaigns and were not able to attain influence on this variable.  Though the public 
favoured climate change measures and Kyoto, the final decision was made despite 
their opinion. 
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“The era of procrastination is coming to a 
close, in its place we are entering a period 
of consequences” 
Winston Churchill 
Chapter 1: Theme and Research Question 
1.1 Theme  
The topic of this study is sub national actors gaining influence in the United States of 
America (hereafter the US) on a particular political issue.  The political issue and thus 
the case of the study is climate and the attempt to influence the political agenda and 
policy making will be the main focus.   
 
The research question in the study is to determine to what extent and how the 
American oil industry sought to influence the US decision to first sign the Kyoto 
Protocol and then not to ratify it.  I am explaining an empirical phenomenon meaning 
to what extent influence was achieved.  A more precise presentation of the research 
question will be given later in the chapter.   
 
The study compares two dimensions, the signing versus the non ratification of the 
Kyoto Protocol and proved variation in these dimensions will be studied and analysed.  
This is therefore a comparative case study of two different phases; the first phase takes 
place between the establishment of the GCC in 1989 and the signing of the Kyoto 
Protocol in 19971 and the second phase between the signing and the decision not to 
ratify the Protocol in 2001.  A thorough explanation of the choice of time frames will 
be given in chapter four.  Due to the topic and structure of the study, empirical 
material will be of most significance when attempting to answer the research question 
while theoretical framework will serve as tools in analysing the data. 
 
                                                 
1 The US formally signed the Kyoto Protocol on November 12th 1998, however the Protocol was adopted in 
December 1997 and I have thus used this as the basis for my time frame. 
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Before giving a more thorough presentation of my research question and my 
motivation for the study, I will give a short introduction of the background of the 
thesis, namely the international climate regime, the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the 
actors and the arena2 of the thesis.  I will also present my expectations for the study as 
well as its structure at the end of the chapter. 
1.1.1 Scope  
Political attention to climate change is a modern phenomenon.  Climate change was 
first discovered in the 1800’s, but without trying to identify any causes for this change.  
It is now, however, generally, but not completely accepted that industrialisation and 
the burning of fossil fuels have caused severe consequences for our planet, resulting in 
such human induced damages as climate change.   
Though most people agree that preservation of the environment is important, 
consensus on this matter is not easily achieved either internationally, or, in some cases, 
even at a national level.  In order to reduce such damages, the international community 
must agree on internationally binding actions to be taken.  If not, the tragedy of the 
commons3 will take place, because while some will endorse the international rules on 
reducing climate change, others will not and due to the lack of international laws 
penalising environmental crimes, they will get away with it4. 
 
This study will focus on the oil industry in the US and its policies on climate control.  
Furthermore the study will look into the industry’s goals, efforts and success in 
influencing President Clinton’s decision to sign the Kyoto Protocol compared to 
President Bush’s decision not to ratify it.   
  
1.1.2 The international climate regime 
During the past 20 years focus in climate change has become an increasingly 
important issue on the international political agenda.  In his article The History of the 
                                                 
2 The term arena is defined as the place where actions are executed, in other words, where the actions of the 
study takes place (Berge 2004: 13). 
3 Garrett Hardin introduced the term “tragedy of the commons” in his article by the same name, illustrating the 
destruction of common resources.  The tragedy occurs when people act individually, taking advantage of the 
resources, thus the result can be destruction of common resources (Østerud 1990:390).  
4 This is known as the free-rider problem. 
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Global Climate Change Regime, Bodansky (2001:23) divides the development of the 
Climate Change regime into five periods.  The first period is the foundational period 
in which the scientific concern about global warming developed.  Questions on global 
warming were raised in the US Congress and in the UN General Assembly.  In 1972 
during the Stockholm conference, the United Nations developed the UN Environment 
Programme (UNEP), an organisation focusing on creating conventions for 
environmental protection that is meant to lead to negotiations and international law.  
The second period is the Agenda Setting Period between 1985 and 1988.  By this 
point, the climate change issue was on the international political agenda.  The 
discovery of the Antarctic ozone hole resulting from emissions of chlorofluorcarbons 
(CFC’s) sparked a great interest in reducing pollution and creating policies on 
preventing climate change.  During this time frame, the Vienna Convention and the 
Montreal Protocol were signed, taking the first international steps on reducing 
emissions of ozone destructing gases.  The Montreal Protocol aimed at freezing the 
domestic CFC consumption at 1986 levels.  In the US, the interest for climate change 
was given additional attention with the drought and heat wave that struck North 
America.   
The third period lasted from 1988 to1990.  Until 1988, the climate change issue was 
mostly addressed by NGO’s, but in 1988 it became an intergovernmental issue due to 
the 1988 General Assembly resolution on climate change (Bodansky 2001: 28).  
Several large summits were held where states gathered to discuss reduction of global 
warming and stabilize carbon dioxide (CO2) levels and emissions.   
The main topics at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
negotiations were targets and timetables for emissions reductions, financial assistance 
and technology transfer.  The institutions and implementation mechanisms of these 
topics make out the fourth period.  Within this phase, the Rio Convention in 1992 
took place, where the UNFCCC was adopted.  The importance of the Rio Convention 
was quite large as it created a fundament for other important Protocols, most notably, 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
The last period takes place post Rio and during the negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol 
in 1997.  Unlike other Protocols, Kyoto specifies obligations for industrialised 
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countries to limit and reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions.  A more thorough 
description of the Kyoto Protocol will be addressed below. 
 
As for the actions taken to prevent climate change from developing, there are three 
different types of actions that have played a part in environmental diplomacy the last 
20 years.  They are not competitive, but complement each other, meaning one does not 
rule out the other.  The first alternative is international agreements on emission limits 
where states are given maximum quotas or percentile reductions. 
The second alternative is environmental fees and taxes in order to reduce emissions.  
Finally, the third alternative is the distribution of quotas; selling and buying of 
quotas are done in markets established for this cause.  The Kyoto Protocol falls in 
under the first and last category and it is the strictest environmental protocol to date. 
 
1.1.3 The Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol is an addition to the UNFCCC adopted at the 1992 Rio 
Conference.  The Protocol is the result of international negotiations on the threat of 
climate change which culminated with the Protocol being signed in Kyoto Japan 
December 1997.  The Protocol aims at reducing fossil fuel emission which is the main 
source of GHG and especially CO2.  This international treaty is aimed at achieving 
reduction of GHG emissions.  The release of GHG into the atmosphere is what is 
considered to be responsible for global warming.  The Protocol also aims at reducing 
anthropogenic emissions which will lead to a reduction of concentration of CO2 and 
other GHG in the atmosphere (Schulze et al 2002: 506).  The Protocol is a 
comprehensive document consisting of 28 articles and two annexes the industrialised 
nations (the high per capita income countries also known as the 45 Annex B countries) 
commit themselves to a reduction in fossil fuel emissions in the first commitment 
period (2008-2012) as compared to the emissions in the base year 1990.  The aim for 
the reduction of concentration in the atmosphere is established in the UNFCCC, while 
the reduction of emissions is established in the Protocol.   The Protocol is applied 
differently to each country as some countries are allowed increases while others must 
make larger reductions.  These nations shall further make every effort, when 
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implementing their measures, to reduce negative effects, especially in developing 
countries.  This would include such populous countries as Brazil, China, India and 
Indonesia.  The Protocol allows emissions trading between Annex B countries.  It also 
allows emissions banking and joint implementation.   
The Clinton Administration, by signing the Protocol, would if ratified, commit the US 
to reduce GHG emissions by 7% from 1990 levels on average over the period 2008-
2012.  The US is the largest contributor of GHG emissions in the world (Andresen and 
Agrawala 1999: 457).  Considering the GHG emissions in the US had increased with 
18% in the 1990’s (Bang et al 2005:1), their commitments to Kyoto would involve 
large costs (ibid). 
 
1.1.4 The United States of America 
The US is the arena where the subject of this thesis takes place.  More specifically the 
study will focus on the decision making arena in the US, particularly the legislative 
and executive branch namely Congress and the President.  The division of power 
within the US is such that an agreement, like the Kyoto Protocol, even if signed by the 
President, has to be ratified by the Senate with a 2/3 majority.  The US, and especially 
Vice President Al Gore, played an active part in the Kyoto negotiations and although 
they achieved some of their most important demands, the US was one of the countries 
that gave the most concessions to reach a compromise compared to previous positions 
in the Kyoto negotiations (Andresen and Agrawala 1999:465). 
Although the Senate was sceptical throughout the entire process and in 1997 passed 
the Byrd-Hagel resolution in a 95-0 vote indicating what would not be acceptable to 
the Senate at Kyoto (a more thorough presentation of the Byrd-Hagel resolution will 
be given in chapter three), President Bill Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998.  
Further reactions by high ranking Senators indicated that the Protocol would be dead 
on arrival in the Senate5.  On March 18th 2001, only two months after his inauguration, 
President Bush rejected the Protocol, calling it “fatally flawed” (Christensen 2003: 1) 
                                                 
5 This was declared by Chairman of the House Committee on science; Republican F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. 
(http://www.aaaas.org/spp/cstc/pne/pubs/stc/bullitin/articles/12-98/kyoto.htm).  
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and unacceptable because it would harm the US economy and because it failed to 
include developing countries, or 80% of the world’s population6.   
 
As for the American public; when the economy is bad, the environment issues receive 
less support and attention (Michaelowa 1998: 253).  They do however believe global 
warming is real and claim to be concerned about the environment, most notably 
towards visible problems such as clean air and water (The Wirthlin Report 1998:1).  
The most powerful argument for the American public against the US accepting the 
Kyoto Protocol may be the issue of national sovereignty, considering that Americans 
are not comfortable with giving up any personal freedom, energy consuming way of 
life and national power7.  
 
The US is careful to ratify international agreements.  This does not mean they do not 
comply, but when the US ratifies an agreement, it becomes a national law and it 
requires 2/3 majority in the Senate to be ratified.   
 
1.1.5 The actors 
The actor (the American oil industry) was chosen because it is economically powerful 
and influential and thus had the possibility of influencing the US President and Senate 
on the topic of the Kyoto Protocol 
I will present the oil industry more thoroughly in chapter three before the analysis and 
will only give a short introduction of it in this chapter.   
 I have chosen the American Petroleum Institute (API) and the Global Climate 
Coalition (GCC) to represent the American oil industry because they from an early 
stage voiced their opinion against the Kyoto Protocol and worked actively to deny it 
ratification.  Considering ExxonMobil was strongly involved in both, the company 
will also be represented in the study.   
                                                 
6 Letter from President Bush to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig and Roberts (The White House Office of the Press 
Secretary: 13.03 2001) 
7 At the Rio Convention in 1992,  President George Bush sr. declared ”The American Way of Life is Non- 
Negotiable”, emphasizing the American reluctance to reduce usage of oil and gas 
(www.rorg.no/artikler/529.html). 
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API’s position on the Kyoto Protocol is described as follows; 
“The oil and natural gas industry believes that the targets and timetables for reducing 
greenhouse gases contained in the Kyoto protocol would exact too heavy an economic 
price given our current understanding of the evolving science of climate change” 
(API’s homepage8).  The GCC was established in 1989 and was a lobbyist group 
situated in Washington DC.  It consisted of mainly US companies in the fossil fuel 
sector and my study will show that it was established almost for the sole purpose of 
denying Kyoto ratification, or more generally speaking, the targets and timetables 
approach consistent with climate change negotiations and especially Kyoto (Bang et al 
2005:1). The GCC was dissolved in 2001. 
 
When I return to the actors in chapter three, I will present their strategies, interests and 
history as well as explain how they went about to influence the policy makers. 
 
1.1.6 Definitions 
Before presenting the theoretical framework which will create the fundament for the 
study, it is important to define three very important terms in order to create a more 
thorough understanding of the subject.  They are ratification, climate change and 
greenhouse gases. 
 
The term ratification is defined by Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties from 
1969 as “the international act whereby a state indicates its consent to be bound to a 
treaty if the parties intended to show their consent by such an act.  In the case of 
bilateral treaties, ratification is usually accomplished by exchanging the requisite 
instruments, while in the case of multilateral treaties the usual procedure is for the 
depositary to collect the ratifications of all states, keeping all parties informed of the 
situation.  The institution of ratification grants states the necessary time- frame to seek 
the required approval for the treaty on the domestic level and to enact the necessary 
                                                 
8 http://www.api-ec.api.org/environ/index   
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legislation to give domestic effect to that treaty” (Arts. 2 (1) (b), 14 (1) and 169).  As 
mentioned earlier, ratification of an international treaty in the US demands two-thirds 
majority in the Senate. 
 
Climate change is by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
defined as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human 
activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to 
natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods”10.  
 
The UNFCCC also defines greenhouse gases (GHG) in the same article as “those 
gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic that absorb 
and re-emit infrared radiation”11. 
 
1.1.7 Theoretical framework 
In chapter two I discuss which theoretical perspectives I will use to explain my 
findings.  Based on these perspectives I have extracted four independent variables to 
explain the dependent variable influence.  The framework will be an analytical tool 
that enables analysis of the data collected in the study.  After discussing the 
independent variables and the possible effect they can have on influence, I will create 
a model illustrating these effects. 
  
1.1.7.1 The dependent variable 
The dependent variable in the study is the influence the oil industry is able to achieve 
in order to reach its objective.  The term influence is methodically difficult to measure 
and it is therefore important to define how influence can be applied in the study.  In 
order to employ influence as a valid and reliable dependent variable, it is pertinent to 
give a definition that is measurable and acceptable to the theoretical perspectives. 
 
                                                 
9 http://untreaty.un.org/English/guide.asp 
10 Article 1 definitions: http://www.sdinfo.gc.ca/docs/en/climate/uncc_1.cfm 
11 http://www.sdinfo.gc.ca/docs/en/climate/uncc_1.cfm  
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Influence is positioned between the objective of the actor and the result.  It is between 
these two components that the actor can exert influence and it is here the actor may 
achieve its goal.   
 
In this study, the term influence is used to indicate to what degree the oil industry was 
successful in reaching its objectives in regards to the Kyoto Protocol.  Were they able 
through different means to persuade decision makers to act according to their wishes? 
 
In chapter two I will define the term influence and discuss its relevance in my study.  I 
will simultaneously operationalise the term influence and describe how it is measured.  
 
1.1.7.2 Independent variables 
Based on the theories I have selected, the independent variables in the study are public 
mobilisation, unity, financial resources and public opinion.  My assumption is that 
these independent variables will have independent effects on the dependent variable 
influence, and serve as explanations as to how influence is achieved. Relations 
between the independent variables will not be explored.  The variable Political 
mobilisation is important in order to influence decision makers.  This variable 
includes legislative bodies or arena access and public mobilisation.  Being able to 
access the decision making arena may prove necessary to obtain influence and public 
mobilisation may prove influential in mobilising the public in their direction and thus 
achieving influence.  The independent variable unity (I will define the term unity in 
the theory chapter) could lead to increased influence for the industry according to the 
theoretical perspective I am using.  By appearing unified and together on an issue, the 
industry will appear stronger and this could possibly lead to influence.  Financial 
resources indicate the economic situation of the industry.  This variable explains the 
possibility of using its financial resources to obtain influence on different levels.  The 
last variable public opinion describes the attempts the oil industry made to influence 
the opinion of the public on the issue of the Kyoto Protocol.  This variable argues the 
benefits of having the public opinion on ones side and how it can lead to influence.   I 
will discuss the independent variables more thoroughly in chapter two. 
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1.1.8 Methodology 
This thesis is a qualitative study.  The reason for this assessment is that although 
quantitative expressions are employed, the study does measure and analyse the data by 
utilising numbers (Hellevik 1997: 14).   
In section two chapter two I will address the methodology of the study.  The study has 
been categorised as a comparative case study and I will discuss how this study fulfils 
the qualifications of a comparative case study.  I will also discuss how data was 
collected, hereunder the sources used in the study, potential problems, reliability and 
validity.  I have chosen to present the methodology separately as I feel it necessary to 
describe how the data was collected and how it was utilised in order to establish the 
credibility of the study. 
 
1.2 Research question 
1.2.1 Choice of theme and background 
My motivation for choice of theme was my interest in the process leading up to the 
US’ decision first to sign and then not ratify and implement the Protocol.  Their 
decision was made despite the fact that the Kyoto Protocol, although quite 
controversial, is the only international protocol on restrictions of CO2 emissions.  I was 
intrigued by the international community’s ability to achieve consensus on the 
Protocol as well as the US choice to go against the rest of the world by rejecting it and 
possibly threatening the future of the Protocol.   
 
1.2.2 Purpose 
The purpose of the study is to explain why the oil industry was successful in achieving 
their goal in not having the Protocol ratified but was unsuccessful in the fact that the 
Protocol was signed. Was it their influence that led to the decision not to ratify the 
Protocol, or did they have little influence in the decisions?  I will look into how 
influence (if any) was achieved by the industry and how it was exploited in order to 
reach their objectives.    
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1.2.3 Research question 
The research question in this study is; 
“To what extent and how did the American oil industry seek to influence the US 
decision first to sign and then not ratify the Kyoto Protocol?” 
 
The oil industry attempted to influence the signing and ratification of the Protocol and 
the study will therefore examine to what degree they achieved influence.  The study 
will explore what the difference was in 1997 when the Protocol was signed by 
President Clinton despite the oil industry’s objection and in 2001 when President Bush 
decided not to ratify the Protocol, a decision that was in accordance with the views and 
wishes of the oil industry.  This study will look at which factors were decisive for the 
difference in influence and how can they be explained.   
 
 1.2.4 Expectations 
The study is not an attempt to create new theoretical framework or achieve new 
findings about the US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the actions taken 
by the oil industry.  I do, however, expect to find out what plan was created by the 
actors to reach their objective, how and if influence by the actors was achieved and 
what methods were used.  Simultaneously, I will look into why the oil industry was 
unsuccessful in preventing the Kyoto Protocol to be signed and whether the industry 
was influential in the decision not to ratify the Protocol.  Furthermore I expect to find 
whether it was indeed anything they could have done differently, or whether perhaps 
the oil industry had no influence whatsoever, and that the decision not to ratify the 
Protocol was made regardless of their efforts.  This will be the topic of the analysis.     
 
1.2.5 Structure 
In order to limit the study and the vast amount of empirical data around this topic, I 
selected the API and the GCC to represent the oil industry and the sceptics of the 
Kyoto Protocol.  Considering its strong involvement in the API and the GCC, 
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ExxonMobil will also be represented.  I have limited the study to the oil industry’s 
activity within the US, thus the study takes place as mentioned at a national level and I 
will only include the international level where relevant.  The structure of the study 
consists of this introductory chapter giving a brief background of the study and serving 
as an introduction to the remainder of the study.  Immediately following the 
introduction is the theoretical chapter where the theories will be given a thorough 
presentation and an explanatory model will be created.  This chapter will also include 
the methodology of the study where the usage of case study along with a discussion of 
the collecting of data and reliability of the sources will take place.  Following the 
chapter on theoretical framework will be a presentation of the actors in chapter three, 
where material necessary for making an analysis will be presented.  Chapter four is the 
analysis where I will try to discuss and explain the influence achieved, or lack thereof 
between 1989 and 1997.  In chapter five I will analyse the influence obtained by the 
oil industry between 1997 and 2001 before comparing the influence of the oil industry 
in the two phases in chapter six.  Finally, I will conclude my findings in chapter seven. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
 
In this chapter I will introduce and discuss the theoretical perspectives used to help 
explain the research question and work as a fundament for the analysis.  My goal is to 
find out how the oil industry tried to influence the US’ decision to first sign and then 
not ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  Influence is thus a key word and below I will give an 
interpretation and definition of the term and discuss the utilisation of this expression. I 
will also address the potential methodical problems I can encounter by using this term.  
In part two of this chapter I will present the methodology of the study.  I will discuss 
the usage of case study and the process of collecting data along with the reliability and 
validity of the data collected in the study.   
 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
My analytical model will be to examine the effect of influence and measure it against 
factors extracted from theoretical framework which will serve as analytical tools in the 
study.  This will create my theoretical framework.  The framework will allow me to 
measure variations in the dimensions put forth in the analysis and help explain the 
importance and relevance of the facts presented which in turn may enable me to 
answer the research question. 
 The dependent variable in the study is influence of the oil industry.  Such influence 
may be achieved through different means and in different arenas.  There are four 
independent variables which I have extracted from three theoretical perspectives.  The 
perspectives I will employ in the study are the perspective by Tora Skodvin and 
Steinar Andresen (2003) which focus on nonstate influence.  I will also use the 
perspective by Arild Underdal (1998) which focuses amongst others on the ratification 
of environmental agreements along with the perspective of the unitary rational actor. 
The last perspective is by Mark Smith (2000) and deals with the perspective of unity in 
business and public opinion.  The independent variables extracted from these 
perspectives make up the sub areas which this chapter and the analysis is divided into.  
I will first present and discuss these independent variables before I create an 
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explanatory model explaining the relations between the variables.  There is always a 
possibility that there are other factors with stronger explanatory power than the 
independent variables I have selected.  This may reduce the explanatory power of the 
independent variables and is a consideration that must be taken into account in the 
analysis. 
 
The use of theories is restricted by my decision to mainly address actions taken at the 
national level, and only include actions taken at the international level where deemed 
necessary.  This is done in order to limit the study, but most importantly, because the 
focus will be on the oil industry operating within the US.   
 
2.2 The dependent variable influence 
Before commencing the discussion on the independent variables and why they are 
applicable to the thesis, I will give a more thorough explanation of the dependent 
variable. 
As mentioned in the introduction chapter, the measurement of influence is challenging 
in political science.  Establishing what gives an actor influence can be difficult as there 
can be many factors which together lead to influence.   
 
Influence is found between goal and outcome for the actor as mentioned in chapter 
one.  It is amid these two components that influence may be achieved and that the 
goals of the actor may be realised.   
 
In an article by Betsill and Corell (2001) the authors approach the problem of 
influence.  The authors define the term influence and describe how to identify non 
governmental organisations (NGO) influence in environmental negotiations (2001: 
65). They argue that the discussion of influence is absent in research and that scholars 
rely on different areas in establishing whether influence was achieved.  The root of the 
problem of defining influence is perhaps that it is related to the term power which is 
another difficult term to define in political science (ibid: 72).  Though I will not 
explore the relationship between power and influence further, Betsill and Corell state 
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that influence is “a relationship between actors and emerges in the political process” 
(2001: 73) while power “refers to capability” (ibid) and power may hence “be 
converted into influence” (ibid).  Influence by nonstate actors in multilateral 
negotiations tends not to have power but the ability of persuasion (ibid). 
 
In their article, Betsill and Corell create a “framework for analysis of NGO influence 
in negotiation of international environmental agreements” (2001: 68).  In previous 
research, influence by nonstate actors has been measured by access, resources and 
activities and by relying on different arenas; comparison of influence in different cases 
will be difficult (ibid: 69).  Therefore, the authors argue that it is important to focus on 
the effects of participation by NGOs in negotiations in addition to their participation 
and activity in general.  It is thus necessary to examine the goal attainment of the 
NGOs at different levels (ibid: 71).  It is therefore essential to ask “whether political 
outcomes reflect the objectives of NGO’s” (ibid).  In other words were the oil 
industry’s objectives shown in the outcome?  Furthermore, the authors state that “A 
comparison of NGO goals with outcomes provides more concrete evidence of NGO 
influence than a focus limited to activities, access and/or resources” (ibid).   
 
The framework deals with influence in international environmental negotiations.  My 
study focuses on the influence by a nonstate actor at a national level, and thus 
employing the framework by Betsill and Corell may be problematic.  The article’s 
limitation to the international level has been criticised by Skodvin and Andresen 
(2003).  In their article, influenced is also discussed at a national level.  Skodvin and 
Andresen state that in contrast to the unitary rational actor model (this model will be 
described later in the chapter), “states are not in full control over “their” societies but 
are themselves influenced and constrained by society” (2003: 67). This indicates that 
sub-national groups, such as in this case the oil industry, “may influence both the 
states positions in international negotiations and their implementation of international 
commitments” (ibid).  Skodvin and Andresen point out three factors where nonstate 
actors may influence states’ negotiation positions and in the case of the oil industry the 
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factor of nonstate actors’ strength12 in policy making process along with the factor of 
“nonstate actors’ access to central decision making arenas and processes at the 
domestic level” (ibid) appear to be of most interest in this study.   
 
Measuring influence is problematic because influence is often seen as a dichotomous 
variable, meaning either one has influence or one does not, or as stated by Skodvin and 
Andresen (2003: 66); “either the policy response is consistent with the nonstate actor’s 
position or it is not”.  However, in their article it is argued that influence is instead a 
continuous variable and that “the extent to which nonstate actors’ positions are 
reflected in policy outcomes is a matter of degrees” (ibid).  Skodvin and Andresen 
argue that influence may be achieved on three levels (ibid).  These levels can be 
interpreted as weak, medium or strong influence levels, as the first level gives the 
actors a right to be heard but their positions are not reflected.  The second level the 
positions of the actors are accepted into the decision making process and finally the 
third level the positions of the actors are reflected in a larger extent than the other 
levels though this is not necessarily an inclination of complete acceptance of the actors 
positions (ibid).   
 
2.2.1 Operationalisation  
By employing the term influence I will try to measure whether the actions taken by the 
oil industry made a difference on the outcome.  Did the industry have any authority or 
were they able to persuade or perhaps even pressure the decision makers?  In the case 
of the Kyoto Protocol, the outcome is already known as the decision to sign the 
Protocol and then not to ratify it has already been made.  This decision indicates that 
the oil industry was perhaps not influential in the period leading up to the signing, but 
could have obtained influence between the signing and the decision not to ratify the 
Protocol. 
 
                                                 
12 Strength is by Skodvin and Andresen linked to the resources bestowed by the actor and the ability to achieve 
strength is increased if the policy makers are in need of these resources (2003: 68). Strength is operatioanlised 
independently from influence as strength towards other actors does not necessarily imply influence.  Strength is 
also defined as “influence potential” (ibid). 
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I have operationalised the dependent variable based on the theoretical framework of 
Skodvin and Andresen (2003: 66) presented above.  I will utilise influence as a 
continuous variable, there are three levels where influence by the oil industry may be 
obtained instead of only two.  By employing a continuous nature of influence in the 
study, the result of the discussion will thus not necessarily be if the industry had or did 
not have influence, but to what degree they achieved influence, in other words the 
variable is not mutually exclusive as it enables different levels and degrees of 
influence.  
In addition, there may have been different and unforeseen factors which lead to the 
final decision, irrespective of the oil industry.   
 
2.2.2 Definition of influence in the study 
Based on the data presented above and the operationalisation of the term influence, 
this study will employ influence as an indicator of the oil industry’s goal attainment, 
i.e. whether the political outcome reflects the intent or objective of the oil industry.  
This will be measured along a continuous variable.   
 
2.3 Presentation and discussion of the independent variables 
2.3.1 Political Mobilisation 
The independent variable political mobilisation includes two components; legislative 
bodies, which includes arena access and public mobilisation.  In this section I will give 
a more thorough description of this variable and discuss what it is that may give 
political mobilisation influence and what components these factors may have to allow 
an explanation as to how influence was or wasn’t achieved.  I have chosen to initially 
divide the variable and present the two above mentioned components separately before 
ultimately combining them to better explain and give a more thorough presentation of 
the variable. 
2.3.1.1 Legislative bodies  
Before presenting and discussing the framework behind this component, I will first 
clarify the term arena access.  Arena access is the ability an actor has to enter the 
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decision making arena.  This arena (which I defined in chapter one) can be Congress 
and the White House at federal level, or a decision making arena at state level or 
lower.  In this study the decision making arena is the federal level and US Congress 
considering the Kyoto Protocol if ratified would be a national law. 
 
In order for the oil industry to obtain influence, it would be necessary to access the 
decision making arena and be able to influence decision makers, and in this case, the 
people deciding whether Kyoto should first be signed then ratified.  It is also within 
this variable that potential competing actors with counterbalancing views would enter 
and hence this is where the oil industry might face competition.   
 
When deciding the degree of influence an actor may achieve, it is necessary to 
measure the possible strength an actor may obtain.  The term relative strength is 
introduced by Steinar Andresen and Tora Skodvin and arranges the possibility of 
influence in three levels; (Skodvin and Andresen 2003: 67): 
1) The strength of the nonstate actor in the policy making process 
2) The strength of counterbalancing forces, i.e. other nonstate actors with 
conflicting positions; 
3) The Political opportunity structure, i.e. nonstate actors’ access to central 
decision making arenas and processes at the domestic level (ibid). 
 
The factors mentioned above make up the term relative strength in relations to other 
actors.  In other words, even though the oil industry is a powerful actor, other actors 
may be as powerful or even more powerful on a particular dimension.  This would 
make the oil industry weaker regardless how strong they are.   
 
Therefore, if another actor showed more strength and obtained more arena access, they 
would be stronger than the oil industry.  There are other strong actors willing to ratify 
and implement the Kyoto Protocol which I will briefly address in the analysis.  
Regardless how powerful the oil industry was and how powerful they seemed, they 
would still not be able to achieve influence if other actors were stronger.   
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Could they achieve influence?  This variable is an attempt to measure the influence 
obtained by the oil industry and search to find whether influence was achieved in this 
arena.  Considering the final decision for the ratification of the Protocol would be 
taken by the Senate, this would be an important arena to gain access and influence on.  
Access to legislative bodies such as Senators, lobbyists, House members et cetera 
would be important in order to voice the opinion of the industry.  As stated by Skodvin 
and Andresen, “the nonstate actors can target legislative bodies more specifically 
particularly to mobilise sufficient political support to block (eventual) ratification of an 
international agreement (unwanted by the nonstate actor)” (2003:68).  This could be an 
explanatory factor in my study on how arena access could prove beneficial for the oil 
industry achieving influence and ultimately denying Kyoto ratification.  
Simultaneously, public mobilisation directed at making the public aware of the views 
of the industry as well as once established their views also persuade the public in their 
direction, and this way indirectly pressuring the decision makers.  I will return to this 
later in the chapter. 
 
This perspective explains strategies and it is therefore important to specify why it is 
applicable in this study.  Though I am not explaining the strategies of the oil industry 
per se I am looking into the actions taken to achieve influence and whether the 
industry was able to obtain influence.  The perspective explains how influence may be 
achieved on different levels and what could explain the achievement of influence, and 
thus I believe this perspective to be applicable to the study. 
 
Within the dimension of political mobilisation, the perspective of the unitary rational 
actor is of interest.  The unitary rational actor model presumes that actors (in this case 
the US) will act in its best interest.  According to Model B; The Domestic Politics of 
Implementation by Underdal (1998:13), even though the US acts in its best interest, 
they might still be unable to deliver due to domestic political constraints.  The 
possibility of political failure can make a state act against its best interest for this 
reason.  By being able to access the political arena, it is possible for actors to 
influence, pressure or persuade decision makers to make decisions that might not be 
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ideal or ultimate.  Political failure was an important factor in the US, as the Senate 
early on voiced objections against the Protocol.  For a US President, signing an 
international agreement and then having it rejected in the Senate could be considered a 
failure to the Administration.  This would be an important consideration for the oil 
industry in deciding which strategy they would use to influence the policy makers as a 
president who has signed an international agreement would most likely want it ratified.   
 
Underdal (1998: 15) brings up the problems with environmental policies.  
Environmental agreements cause difficulties as they restrain legal activities (for 
instance factories releasing emissions, usage of coal for fuel and so on).  Furthermore, 
they demand great economic costs for society, and voluntary fulfilment of the Protocol 
is necessary.  As for Kyoto, no legal action will be taken if signatories do not comply 
(this is being altered now, 8 years after it was signed).   Therefore, one is dependent on 
the good nature of the other signatories.  The costs of Kyoto were a big issue in the 
debate and the oil industry stressed the large costs the agreement would have on the 
US and used it as an important argument to go against the Protocol.   
 
In order to solve the problem of environmental damage one must first deal with the 
legal activities that are causing the damage (Underdal 1998: 15).  An international 
conference can, according to this theory, create interest on a specific topic and focus 
the attention towards this subject (Underdal 1998: 20).  In the case of the Kyoto 
Protocol, attention would then be drawn to CO2 emissions and the need to reduce 
emission in the US.  Finally, model B suggests that signing (and ratifying) an 
international agreement can make a significant difference.  Model B focuses first upon 
the impact the agreement may have upon the domestic distribution of power and 
influence, and, second, upon incentives generated by the act of signing (Underdal 
1998:18-19).  The Signing (and ratifying) of an international agreement tends to 
empower the governmental agencies, and possibly the intergovernmental organisations 
(IGO), in charge vis-à-vis other branches of government (or IGO’s) and also vis-à-vis 
the societal actors to whom the regulations apply (Underdal 1998:19).  Also, as 
mentioned, the mere fact that an international conference is about to take place can 
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help focus attention on a particular problem and thus serve as a stimulus to policy 
making at the national level (Underdal 1998:20).  The fact that the Protocol was signed 
might have created a greater interest in ratifying it considering the first step had been 
taken.  If this is so, how then would the oil industry be able to achieve influence if 
there was a greater interest in having Kyoto ratified? 
 
The factor of political failure mentioned above could be determinative considering the 
Senate voiced such large objections to the Protocol.  If the oil industry was able to 
access the political arena they would be able to induce objections and that could, 
according to this perspective, lead to the decision to not ratify the Protocol.  In 
addition, it must be taken into consideration that during the 1997- 2001 time frame 
there was a change in the Administration, and a Democratic President was replaced 
with a Republican.  What perhaps was considered political failure for one 
Administration was perhaps not failure for the other and the new Administration could 
also grant different actors access to the political arena.  These factors will be discussed 
in the analysis. 
 
2.3.1.2 Public mobilisation 
This component of the independent variable political mobilisation takes forth the 
industry’s attempt to mobilise and also influence the American public.  Public 
mobilisation deals with the industry’s attempt to mobilise the actions of the public and 
to engage them in acting accordingly to the wishes of the oil industry.  These actions 
desired by the industry could be for instance having the public vote for candidates with 
views consistent with the oil industry.  This component is of interest because due to 
theoretical framework and data I will present, the public could be imperative in the oil 
industry’s attempt to achieve influence.   
 
This variable is connected to the previous variable, as gaining the approval of the 
public might give access to the political arena.  By influencing the public and 
informing them of the topic and their views, the oil industry could create more 
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attention on the topic and therefore, with the help of the public be able to access the 
political arena. 
Skodvin and Andresen approach the importance of public mobilisation in their article 
(2003: 68).  They state that by mobilising public opinion and achieving support of its 
position, the actor can then mobilise political support (ibid).  Political and public 
mobilisation may hence be connected as the one may lead to the other.  These 
components are again connected to resources possessed by the actor and how this may 
lead to influence.  By being able to mobilise the public and through them achieve 
political support on an issue, in this case disapproval of the Kyoto Protocol, influence 
may be achieved with or without political mobilisation and arena access (ibid). 
 
The variable political mobilisation may then based on the discussions presented above 
summed up as follows.  In order for the oil industry to achieve influence through 
political mobilisation they must access the decision making arena and legislative 
bodies.  By mobilising the public in their favour their position may be strengthened 
and by scoring high on these components they may ultimately achieve a high score on 
the influence dimension in this variable and hence obtain their goal. 
 
2.3.2 Unity  
Smith (2000) employs the term business unity in his perspective and I have defined the 
term as agreement within a business (or in this case industry) on a particular issue.  
Though the perspective explores unity in business, it is also applicable to industry.  
Unity can be interpreted as consensus within the industry and the appearance of unity 
is dependent on the degree of consensus the industry has on a particular issue, in this 
case the Kyoto Protocol (Skodvin and Andresen 2003:68).  Regarding my research 
question, the objective will be to measure unity within the oil industry on the topic of 
the Kyoto Protocol and whether this may have given them influence.   
 
There is a common assumption that unity leads to strength in American business.  The 
phrase “United we stand, divided we fall” is a reasonable expectation about the 
operation of business power.  The logic behind this assumption is stated by Smith who 
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quotes Dahl; “political effectiveness of any group, meaning its ability to steer 
authoritative decisions in its favour despite resistance from other groups, depends upon 
its potential for unity” (Smith 2000:3).  When a company (or an industry) experience 
internal disagreement, their potential for political power may be reduced.  When the 
industry is united and organised, the effectiveness of promoting their cause is 
increased (Smith 2000:4).  In other words, in order for the oil industry to appear strong 
and achieve influence, it would according to this perspective be in their best interest to 
be united if possible.  Additionally, if the industries disagreed internally and were not 
able to reach a decision a majority would support, they would spend too much time 
trying to convince each other in order to reach an agreement favourable to the 
majority.   
  
When corporations cooperate in business, the consequences can be increase in prices, 
reduced competition and higher profits to name a few.  Scholars have expected similar 
consequences if this is transferred to the political arena (ibid)  
The notion that American firms gain power by sharing political goals is the kind of an 
assumption Smith claims requires no discussion because “a long tradition of American 
political thought invites scholars to accept the unity-leads-to-strength assumption” 
(Smith 2000:5).   
 
“Unified policy preferences develop when firms experience a common economic 
threat to profits” (Smith 2000:17).  When a company (or in my case industry) is going 
through an economic decline, it is more likely to stay together and be unified during 
the troublesome economic period.  The oil industry was at risk of reduced income and 
higher taxes if the Kyoto Protocol was ratified and though it would not ruin them 
financially it would demand large costs and this fear could have united the industry.  
When the economy flourishes, the company will be more likely to obtain different 
preferences and therefore the company will be less united.  Scholars point to social and 
political relationships among firms that encourage the congealing of preferences.  
These mechanisms include overlapping corporate boards, common social experiences 
of corporate executives and commercial banks acting as intermediaries.  It is important 
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to keep in mind that companies often are in competition against each other and that a 
threat to one company is not necessarily a threat to another.  However, most oil 
companies would have to make changes and restructure to comply with regulations 
and that could prove costly for most of them.  I find this relevant to my research 
question as it examines the possibility that the oil industry united in the fear of losing 
money due to the possibility of having to make large changes in order to comply with 
international regulations. 
 
“When the size and scope of government is at stake, business frequently unifies” 
(Smith 2000:19).  Within the American traditional core values lies a deep suspicion of 
big business, as well as big labour and big government.  This results in most 
Americans favouring a decentralised political structure, avoiding centralised authority 
(Smith 2000:6).  According to Smith, American political culture includes a fear of 
concentrated power undermining democracy, contrary to other industrialised nations 
where business leaders tolerate and even desire stronger government control over the 
marketplace.  “A belief that business unity would result in business power represents a 
natural extension of this tradition” (ibid).  The central question therefore comes down 
to whether or not business unifies to promote a common agenda and hence achieve 
influence (ibid).  In my case, did the oil industry unify to achieve what they wanted, 
which was to not ratify the Kyoto Protocol? 
 
There are several issues politicians feel will hurt American business.  These issues 
include strong restrictions on pollution and it is believed this would “hinder investment 
and precipitate an economic slowdown” (Smith 2000:145).  The result is that 
politicians will be less willing to support these issues as it could potentially threaten 
their electoral career.  This is of particular interest in my case as it would be necessary 
for the industries to gain support from elected officials.  According to Smith, if the 
politicians feel their careers would be threatened, it would not matter how strong or 
united an industry is.   
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Unity may also be extended to include allies outside the industry who share mutual 
interests which in this case would be to prevent Kyoto from being signed and ratified.  
The rationale may be to achieve benefits of even stronger effects to achieve a common 
goal.  An example of such an ally to the oil industry is the conservative movement in 
the US as the conservative movement and the fossil fuel industry’s interests often 
coincide (McCright and Dunlap 2003: 368). 
 
To sum up the independent variable unity, based on the framework presented, unity or 
consensus in an industry may prove beneficiary and can be explanatory when 
measuring the influence the industry has scored on the dimension.  Appearing unified 
may give the indication of being strong and this may enable the industry to achieve 
influence. 
 
2.3.3 Financial resources 
Financial resources could be determinative in an effort to achieve influence.  This is 
because in order to access arenas, persuade politicians and the public it could be 
decisive to have the finance to make this possible. The American oil industry is 
financially a very large industry and would therefore have the means to achieve access 
by being able to finance lobbyists, and furthermore be able to run advertising 
campaigns in order to influence and inform the public on their views.   
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, if the actor possesses resources policy makers 
seek, the possibility for influence may increase (Skodvin and Andresen 2003: 68).  If 
policy makers were to be sponsored (for instance for their election campaigns) by the 
nonstate actor, the actor may possibly achieve influence in donating financial 
resources in exchange for the candidate’s voting accordingly to the views of the actor.  
The American oil industry gave large donations to Republican candidates before 1997 
and 2001 something I will explore in the analysis.  This variable may have explanatory 
power in explaining the why the oil industry spent financial resources on sponsoring a 
political party and their campaigns.  By sponsoring politicians and presidential 
nominees they would also perhaps be able to achieve access to the inner circle of 
decision making. 
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Financial capital may be linked to the variable public opinion as influencing the public 
may be done through advertisements and campaigns which demand financial capital.  
This could help the oil industry get their issues on the political agenda as well as 
giving them the possibility to sway the public in their favour.  This would also be 
favourable against their counterparts.  The relationship between the variables will 
however not be explored further in the analysis.  Their economic resources could be a 
strength that enables influence and this is yet another factor that could potentially 
prove favourable to the oil industry.  Furthermore, by supporting scientific research 
favourable to the views of the oil industry and think tanks, an actor will be able to 
make their positions known and thus focus more attention on the matter.  As data 
presented in the following chapters will explain, the oil industry spent large resources 
on scientific research and think tanks.  For instance the GCC is considered to be a 
think tank13 and a lobbyist for the industry.  By sponsoring research the question is 
whether the industry would then be able to control the conclusions from the findings in 
these studies.  It could also be interpreted as an attempt to procrastinate the discussion 
by claiming new research was needed before drawing any conclusions from the 
climate change debate.  This could prove influential to the oil industry and will be 
discussed in the analysis. 
 
2.3.4 Public opinion 
This variable state that public mood (or opinion) “emerges as the strongest single 
determinant of whether business sees its preferences approved or rejected in 
legislation” (Smith 2000: 167).  This perspective argues that shaping public opinion 
may be the most effective strategy for advancing its interests (ibid).  While the 
variable public mobilisation measures the actions of the public, public opinion deals 
with the opinion and attitude of the public and how that can be influenced.  It is 
applicable as a tool to measure whether public opinion could prove influential to the 
oil industry  
                                                 
13 Think tanks are by Smith defined as “private nonprofit organizations engaged primarily in investigating 
questions relevant to public policy.  These organizations originate, develop, evaluate and publicize ideas about 
the policy direction the nation should pursue” (Smith 2000: 169).  
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The perspective of Smith suggests that think tanks (like the GCC) could shift public 
opinion in the favour of the industry “which through the process of political 
representation will later bring policy decisions into closer alignment with what 
business collectively wants” (Smith 2000: 169).  Though related to the variable public 
mobilisation in that public opinion may cause or affect public mobilisation and vice 
versa, they are still two independent variables that measure different methods of 
influence for the oil industry.  The variable is therefore relevant as an explanatory 
factor on why public opinion may lead to influence. In order to measure influence on 
this variable, one can measure media coverage and see whether the oil industry tried to 
influence public opinion this way.  It is also possible to look at the independent 
research published by the oil industry to see whether their publicised results were able 
to sway public opinion.  One can also look at polls taken on the public’s view on the 
issue though these can be more employed as an assessment of how the public viewed 
the issue and not as established facts. 
 
2.3.5 An Explanatory Model 
Based on the theoretical framework presented in this chapter and operationalisation of 
the various variables, I have created an explanatory model to enable a better 
understanding of the components I will attempt to measure in the analysis. 
 
Figure 2.3.5.1 An Explanatory Model 
 
 
Political Mobilisation   
Unity                                         Influence 
Finance  
Public opinion  
 
The model indicates four independent variables that will lead to the dependent variable 
influence.  In order to limit the thesis I will only look into the relationship between the 
independent variables versus influence, and how these variables could have given the 
oil industry influence.  Though it is possible there are mutual relationships between the 
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independent variables, I will focus mainly on their relationship with the dependent 
variable.         
 
The model is created in order to illustrate the variables in the analysis.  This is in order 
to evaluate and determine the achievement of influence.  As the model shows, 
influence is the dependent variable which could be achieved through one or more of 
the independent variables.  My assessment at this stage is that the variable political 
mobilisation may lead to influence, as the ability to present their views in the decision 
making arena and obtain support from decision makers could be decisive in gaining 
influence.  Furthermore, public mobilisation, which is the industry’s ability to affect 
the public in their favour and influence their actions, could help gain access to the 
decision makers and could put their case on the political agenda.  
 
It is my assumption that unity within the industry is likely to occur when the industry 
believes it will gain on standing together on an issue.  By appearing unified the 
industry will come across as strong and this in turn can lead to influence for the oil 
industry. 
 
Economic resources or finance, meaning the amount of resources the industries 
bestow, has an independent impact which may lead to influence in the US decision not 
to ratify the Kyoto protocol.  This is an assessment based on the fact that the oil 
industry had tremendous economic resources, and were thus able to support and fund 
political parties and candidates favourable to their views.  Additionally, campaigns and 
advertisements to inform and persuade the public and research and experts which 
preferably concur with the views of the oil industry may also be attainable due to 
financial resources.  This could then lead to influence.    
 
Finally, public opinion indicating the views and attitude of the public may give a 
positive score on the influence dimension for the oil industry as it may enable the oil 
industry to have their views presented to the decision makers.  Ultimately it might 
result in legislation favourable to the opinion of the industry being passed. 
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2.3.6 The Theoretical Perspective 
Based upon the theories and explanatory model presented in this chapter, I have 
extracted four variables I will use in order to create an analytical model.   I will use 
these four variables when analysing the material I will attain; 
1) Political mobilisation meaning the possibility for the oil industry to gain access 
to the political arena and mobilise support from the public.   
2) Unity illustrates that a unified position may lead to a high score on the influence 
dimension. 
3) Financial resources indicate that larger resources enabled more influence.  This 
would include financial support of scientific research, establishment of think 
tanks and supporting political parties and candidates. 
4) Public opinion indicates that having the public opinion on the same side will 
prove beneficial to the oil industry when attempting to gain influence. 
 
I will explore the effect of the different variables and measure them independently for 
each time frame before comparing them and the different effects. This way, a 
theoretical approach to the empirical data and the research question of the study can be 
achieved. 
 
2.4 Methodology 
Methodology exists to help us solve empirical problems when conducting research 
(Hellevik 1991:13). In order to give a better understanding of how the process of the 
study took place and how potential problems were solved, I will in this section present 
a definition of the term case study and discuss the basis for categorising the study as a 
case study.  Furthermore, I will address the data of the study, how it was collected, 
sources, control of the data and possible errors that could occur when researching and 
employing the data.  Finally I will discuss the reliability and validity of the study. 
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2.4.1 Case study 
This study is as mentioned in chapter one a comparative case study.  A case study is by 
Andersen (1990: 8-9) defined as a research strategy where you study one or a few 
cases of a general phenomenon.  The case is often studied with an aim for research and 
with several different methods because the boundaries between the phenomenon and 
the context surrounding it cannot be determined in advance.  The case can be a social 
unit, for example an organisation, but also an event or a process, for instance a 
conflict, a resolution or a process of implementation.  Considering it is the process of 
not implementing the Kyoto Protocol I am researching, I consider case study to be the 
most relevant method for this thesis.  Case studies are preferred in situations where 
how or why questions are being posed (did they achieve influence and was it decisive 
for the outcome?), and when the investigator has little control of the events or when 
focus is on a contemporary phenomenon with some real life context. 
My case is discussing the influence of NGO’s in the US.  In my opinion, this study is a 
good example of a case study as it is illustrative of potential NGO influence in 
American politics and how the American political system enables access to the 
decision making arena for nonstate actors.   
 
The study is a comparative case study.  It is comparative because I am comparing two 
case; the phase before the signing and the phase after the signing until the decision not 
to ratify Kyoto was made.  I will explore and consider whether vital aspects and 
explanatory factors with the two cases can give an indication of the difference in 
outcome.  Ultimately the objective is to find different configurations in the explanatory 
factors and whether this can explain the result (Ekberg and Vatnaland 2002:30).   
 
2.4.2 Collecting of data 
In this section I will give a more thorough presentation of how the data was collected 
and how the data will be employed in the analysis.  The study takes forth the oil 
industry in the US and acquiring information on the topic would thus depend on the 
amount of studies done on the topic, the possibility of finding relevant sources for 
interviews and relevant literature written on the subject. 
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2.4.2.1 Sources 
This study has been based on primary sources such as official documents from the UN 
and the White House and secondary sources, mainly relevant academic articles and 
literature, newspaper articles and internet sites.  Fortunately, there is an extensive 
amount of literature on the Kyoto Protocol and the oil industry’s involvement.  
Establishing a background on Kyoto was done through UN documents, as well as 
published literature and articles on the content of the Protocol.  As for the oil industry, 
there was a great deal of articles and books on the subject, as well as newspaper 
articles and documentaries.  The positions of the oil industry were also described on 
the oil companies’ web sites.  The study has therefore to a large extent been based on 
secondary sources.  Potential problems associated with the use of secondary sources 
are described below. 
 
2.4.2.2 Reliability 
Reliability means that others with access to the same data would arrive at the same 
result, and that the information given can be trusted and verified.  Thus one constantly 
has to evaluate the reliability of the sources being used.  It is crucial that the quality of 
the data is high as it can have serious consequences for the study if the data lacks 
reliability.  Considering this study includes secondary sources, it has been necessary to 
take certain precautions.  Secondary sources must be read critically, and preferably be 
verified by other sources.  There are several potential problems one may encounter by 
using secondary sources, the most critical being the credibility of the information and 
the possibility of incorrect information.  For instance may articles have been written to 
intentionally document only certain facts favourable to one side.  Facts presented 
could instead be opinions and documented research could prove to be inconclusive.  
This is for instance the case for newspaper articles which often risk being subjective 
opinions, either by the journalist or by the people being interviewed.  To avoid the 
subjectivity being presented as data, newspaper articles were utilised as an indication 
on how the oil industry used the media to gain attention for their positions.  Official 
statements by oil industry executives and American politicians were also quoted from 
newspaper articles, and verified by other sources if possible.  
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Internet sites were used to achieve an indication on API, GCC and ExxonMobil’s 
official positions.  These were used to give a description on how they viewed the 
Kyoto Protocol and not as facts on the Protocol itself.  In addition was the internet of 
help in order to attain official documents from Congress, The White House and the 
UN  
 
 In order to obtain reliability, information must be cross checked and one is dependent 
on strict and thorough research to verify the documentation presented in the study.   
The possibility of misinterpretation exist, interpretations of statements and facts may 
have been misunderstood and could possibly result in a lower degree of validity.  I 
believe that the thorough research and verification of all data has reduced this 
possibility.  I have employed many different sources and all of them have been 
thoroughly corroborated.   
 
One should also keep in mind that polls and research can be made to suit specific 
views by “hired” experts or using “leading” questions.  Therefore they must be 
verified and documented by other sources in order to be used as documentation. In this 
study I have used polls as an indicator of the American public’s opinion on the Kyoto 
Protocol and their views on whether or not the Protocol should be ratified.  The polls 
have not been used as factual data, meaning they will not be presented as facts but as 
an indication of how the public viewed the topic. 
 
I consider the reliability of this thesis to be sufficiently high, my primary sources are 
official statements or documents from the actor, and the secondary sources have been 
read critically and verified by other sources.   
 
2.4.2.3 Validity 
Validity is defined as the “coherence between the theoretical definition of a variable 
and the operational definition controlling the collecting of data” (Østerud et al 1997: 
285).  There are two kinds of validity; internal and external.  Internal validity is 
explanation building while external validity establishes a domain where findings can 
 32
Chapter 2                                                                    Theoretical Framework and Methodology                         
be generalised (Yin 1994:33).   Validity means to generalise the data over a wider 
population of cases, and validity can easily be connected to reliability, as it is a tool 
preventing the researcher to achieve biased results and enabling others to reach the 
same conclusions based on the same materials.  I will not seek to generalise outside of 
the empirical case I have chosen.  The Kyoto Protocol is a unique phenomenon and it 
is the influence of the oil industry I seek to analyse, not other actors or agreements.  
That way I will avoid external validity. 
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Chapter 3: The Actors and Empirical Background 
 
This chapter will provide a brief introduction of the background of the most important 
views of the oil industry.  This is done in order to give a better comprehension of the 
analysis that will take place in the next chapters.  Considering my study will look at 
the influence achieved to prevent the Kyoto Protocol from being signed and ratified, 
there are two other actors that must be taken into consideration; The Administrations 
of President Clinton and President Bush and the US Congress, more specifically the 
Senate.  These will initially be given a short presentation to provide a better 
background for an understanding of the oil industry and its actions 
 
3.1 The Administrations and Congress 
3.1.1 The Administrations 
Due to the fact that President Clinton signed the Protocol and President Bush refused 
to ratify it, there are two very different approaches to the issue of global warming in 
general and the Kyoto Protocol in particular.  
 
When signing the Protocol in 1998, Vice President Al Gore, who was a prime 
advocate for Kyoto, issued a statement saying: “ Our signing today of the Kyoto 
Protocol reaffirms America's commitment to meeting our most profound 
environmental challenge, global climate change. At the close of the Kyoto conference, 
President Clinton and I made clear his intention to sign this historic accord. In the 
eleven months since Kyoto, the evidence of global warming has grown only stronger, 
and so has our resolve.” (Office of the Vice President, The White House: November 
12, 1998).  Vice President Gore had a strong commitment and interest in the issue of 
climate change. He was however, considered to be an outsider and not very influential 
as a vice president (Agrawala and Andresen 1999: 473).  Although he spent his vice 
presidency educating President Clinton as well as the public on global warming and 
the need for policies (ibid: 474), he was not able to achieve support in the Senate. 
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The Clinton Administration’s commitment to this issue can also be judged from 
statements and preparations before the meeting in Kyoto and the fact that both the 
President and the Vice President were present in Kyoto.  
In preparation for Kyoto there were several meetings in the White House and 
according to the conservative Heartland Institute “Environmental groups also played a 
key role in formulating the Clinton administration’s strategy for the Kyoto conference. 
Vice President Gore, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt, and President Clinton himself 
met with leaders of fourteen NGO’s in preparation for an October 6 White House 
conference on climate change. The groups pressed the Administration to come through 
with a tough U.S. proposal for Kyoto, including strict targets and carbon-reduction 
timetables.” (Sheehan 1997) 
 
During the Clinton Administration which lasted from January 1993 to January 2001, 
the oil industry was not invited into the decision arena, something I will discuss more 
thoroughly in the analysis chapter.  Early in his presidency, Bill Clinton proposed the 
British Thermal Unit (BTU) tax, a tax on the heat content on energy fuel which would 
lead to a reduction of GHG emissions (Andresen and Agrawala 1999: 461).  The tax 
failed to pass a Democratic controlled Senate and resulted in a political failure for 
Clinton.  The consequence of this failure was that no new proposals for national 
measures to combat climate change were presented during his presidency (ibid: 470).  
President Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol but never pushed for ratification in the 
Senate.  The potential reasons for this decision will be discussed in chapter five. 
 
Republican George W. Bush took office on January 2001, representing a conservative 
wing of the Republican Party, whose constituents are often associated with fossil fuel 
reserves (Brewer 2003: 8-9).  When President Bush entered office, energy firms were 
given access as some of the members in the innermost circle of the President’s 
advisors, including Vice President Richard Cheney and Political Advisor Karl Rove 
were all opposed to mandatory climate change mitigation policy (Brewer et al 2003: 
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15).  Additionally, several members of the Administration, including Cheney and 
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice had backgrounds in the oil industry14. 
President Bush opposes government intervention in economy and is not favourable to 
policies which would impose changes in the US energy industry (Brewer 2003: 8). 
This could explain why many of his advisors come from the energy, auto and oil 
industries.  The possible impact the data presented above might have had on the 
influence of the oil industry will be discussed in chapter five. 
 
According to the environmental news magazine Grist15, the GCC was also allowed 
access to the political arena and according to a briefing note from the White House, 
Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol in part based on input from the GCC.  
 
3.1.2 Congress 
The US Constitution restricts the freedom of actions by the American President 
(Skjærseth and Skodvin 2003: 215).  The legislative branch Congress is therefore quite 
powerful in the American political system.  The US has a pluralistic political system, 
where consensus- and coalition building can shift the focus over to topics of their 
interest regardless of the national administration (Brewer 2003: 5).  In other words, a 
strong coalition may achieve influence without the support of the presidential 
administration.   
 
In 1994 the Republican Party won the majority in Congress.  From being the minority 
they now held 52.9% of all Congressional seats (McCright and Dunlap 2003: 360).  
This enabled the Republicans to establish their own legislative agenda, including 
deciding which bills would receive attention and which would not (ibid).  One may 
speculate whether the takeover had a positive effect on the oil industry as their 
opportunities to promote their views grew (ibid: 364). 
 
                                                 
14 Excerpt from Boiling Point by Ross Gelbspan (http://www.grist.org/advice/books/2004/07/21/gelbspan-
boiling/). Hereafter Gelbspan 2004. 
15 www.grist.org/news/daily/2005/06/08/1/ 
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In 1997, a few months before the Protocol was signed, the US Senate unanimously 
passed the Byrd-Hagel resolution which made the ratification of Kyoto difficult.  The 
resolution stated that it would not ratify any agreement signed at Kyoto that “would 
impose binding limits on the industrialized nations but not on developing nations 
within the same compliance period” and “would result in serious economic harm to the 
economy of the United States” (105th Congress, 1st session s. res. 98).  Senator Robert 
Byrd was a democratic representative from West Virginia, a coal producing state 
which had a keen interest in staying out of Kyoto. During the 2000 presidential 
election, West Virginia voted Republican for the first time ever and I will get back to 
this in chapter five.   
 
3.2 The oil industry 
The oil industry faces an ethical dilemma when it comes to climate.  It’s a catch- 22 
between the search for a profitable oil industry and the fact that CO2 emissions induce 
climatic changes that are potentially harmful to society (Le Menestrel et al. 2002: 
255).  To this industry, the constraining of CO2 emissions is primarily considered 
through its negative impacts on profit.  When the Kyoto Protocol enters into force, the 
pressure on the oil industry will be tremendous.  The reduction of emissions will 
indirectly lead to a shift towards technologies consuming less or no fossil fuels.  This 
will greatly affect the oil market.  Measures to combat global warming are for these 
reasons considered to be more threatening to the oil industry than traditional pollution 
control measures (McCright and Dunlap 2003: 353).  Actors in this industry must 
choose between the ethical process that leads to a costly consequence and an unethical 
process that leads to profitable consequence (ibid).   
 
3.2.1 Background of API and the GCC 
American Petroleum Institute (API) was founded in 1919 and is the primary trade 
association for over 300 corporations associated with the petroleum industry.  The 
institute is based in Washington DC, USA and works with regional and state oil and 
gas associations in approximately 50 countries.   
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The GCC was established in 1989 in order to present a business voice on the global 
climate- change issue.  It was also formed to lobby on behalf of fossil fuel users and 
producers in Congress (Kolk and Levy 2001: 503).   The GCC is an association of 56 
predominantly US companies, many of which operate in the fossil fuel sector (coal and 
oil in particular), the electric utility industry, transportation-related industries, or the 
chemicals sector.  The GCC highlights the remaining uncertainties in the science and 
argue that the costs of adopting proactive policies would be huge, particularly for the 
US economy (Rowlands 2000: 343-344).  In 2000 the GCC reorganised its 
membership system and members could from then on only be branch organisations 
and not individual companies.  According to Skjærseth and Skodvin this 
reorganisation was done to “counter the negative publicity following from the exits” 
(2001:105)16. 
 
One of the most important companies within the API is ExxonMobil.  Considering 
Exxon is the largest private oil company and even the largest multinational company 
in the world, irrespective of sector (Skodvin and Skjærseth 2003: 44) with over $200 
billion in revenues, it is a strong actor within the API and many of its policies, 
especially those concerning Kyoto, are consistent with those of API.  ExxonMobil was 
also strongly involved with the GCC until it changed its membership system, and then 
continued to be a strong actor through API until the GCC dissolved in 2001.  
 
The oil industry is one of the largest industries in the world. Considering API consists 
of some of the largest oil companies in the world, it is safe to say it’s a very large 
association with a great deal of financial resources.   
 
3.2.2 API and GCC’s policy on climate change and Kyoto 
According to API’s home page17, “the oil and natural gas industry believes that the 
targets and time tables for reducing GHG contained in the Kyoto Protocol would exact 
                                                 
16 The exits refer to oil companies such as BP Amoco and Shell leaving the GCC in 1997 and 1998 respectively. 
17 www.api-ec.api.org/environ/index 
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too heavy an economic price given our current understanding of the evolving science 
of climate change”.  They stress that in order to achieve the goals put forth by Kyoto, 
the US must change the way they use energy and that will prove costly for Americans, 
resulting in higher prices on gasoline, electricity, heating oil and natural gas.  That will 
result in American businesses losing out in the international market place as 
developing nations which are exempt from the Protocol will have lower and more 
competitive prices.  The industry has made estimations that indicate Kyoto would 
reduce US GDP by $200 billion annually.   The declines in economic growth as well 
as the possibility of job losses are other reasons for the API not wanting to join Kyoto.  
They feel it will “unnecessary disrupt the lives of American families” (ibid).   
It has been argued that the US can join Kyoto now and then amend it later to improve 
the Protocol.  However, API emphasizes that because of the American system of 
implementation demanding an international protocol to be national law, it is nearly 
impossible to amend the treaty after it is implemented as it would have to be approved 
by all of the participating nations (ibid). 
Furthermore, API stresses that the scientific results do not concur on the reasons for 
climate change (ibid).  Scientists disagree on whether the problem of climate change is 
a potential threat to mankind or not.  They also stress that it is very difficult to separate 
natural climate changes from human induced climate changes, and therefore deciding 
on public policies is very difficult.  The oil industry and in particular API and GCC 
have contested the legitimacy and findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC)18.  Considering the research by the IPCC is held in high regard 
internationally, the oil industry has attempted to discredit the IPCC and presented 
accusations on manipulation in the organization (Michaelowa 1998:12). 
 
The threat may be real sometime in the distant future, but API feels there is no need to 
take action now.  Instead, API supports more research on the causes of climate change 
and favours development of new technologies that can reduce GHG and be exported to 
                                                 
18 The IPCC consists of the lobby of international climate research and was created in 1988 to investigate climate 
change (Kolk and Levy 2001:503).  The US was one of the main driving forces behind the establishment of the 
IPCC and the organization consists of researchers.  Their regularly published assessment reports “define the base 
for climate negotiations” (Michaelowa 1998: 12).  
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developing countries so that they are enabled to reduce their emissions while they are 
still able to industrialize.  API stresses that “the question is not whether to act, but 
rather what policies are appropriate for the existing state of knowledge on climate 
change”19. 
 
As for the GCC, the chairman of the GCC, Connie Holms, has stated that the Protocol 
is a loser for American households, and that it will cost American families millions of 
dollars and millions of jobs.  The GCC was notoriously known for their aggressive 
activities and lobbying against for instance Kyoto.  When the GCC was dissolved in 
January 2001, the spokesman for the coalition stated the reason for the disbandment 
being; “we have achieved what we wanted to accomplish with the Kyoto Protocol” 
(Najor: 2001). 
 
As mentioned, one of the most prominent actors within the API (and the GCC until 
2001) is ExxonMobil, an active member of the oil industries lobby groups.  Exxon is 
considered to be the most resistive to proactive policies on global climate change 
amongst the oil companies (Rowlands 2000:344).  The reasons for Exxon’s 
unwillingness to support the Kyoto Protocol are almost identical with those of API.  
For instance, Exxon has voiced concern of the economic consequences of Kyoto, as 
well as the Protocol’s decision to exclude the developing countries.  They feel the 
Protocol is too expensive, that it is unfair and that it will not work.   
The GCC claims that gasoline prices would go up extensively and that energy 
consumption would have to drop (Sawin and Davis 2002: 26).  Considering the desire 
of the GCC to kill US ratification of Kyoto, it would be necessary to consider their 
statements with some scepticism.  Furthermore, during the Kyoto negotiations, the 
GCC presented a briefing indicating the possible impact the Kyoto Protocol would 
have on American sovereignty and that the UN and developing countries would take 
control over US economy (ibid: 17). 
 
                                                 
19 http://www.api-ec.api.org/environ/index 
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The actors I have selected all took a reactive strategy to the Kyoto Protocol.  By 
reactive I will utilise the interpretation given by Skjærseth and Sæverud (2006: 6) 
stating that “the essence of a reactive strategy formulation is denial of responsibility 
for the environmental problem at hand as opposed to a proactive strategy which means 
acceptance of responsibility”.  Although Shell and BP both supported the Kyoto 
Protocol and left the GCC, ExxonMobil continued to oppose climate policy (Skjærseth 
and Sæverud 2006:11)20.  In the book by Skjærseth and Skodvin, one of the reasons 
given for ExxonMobil being more reactive is that the company is more carbon 
intensive than Shell and BP and thus more vulnerable to GHG regulation (Skjærseth 
and Skodvin 2003: 201).  Before Exxon and Mobil merged, Mobil although reactive, 
was more diplomatic in its leadership style; however that did not change 
ExxonMobil’s united approach towards discouraging the effects of climate change 
(Kolk and Levy 2001:506). 
 
3.2.3 Climate and Kyoto 
In the climate change discussion, API21 underlines that CO2 is the main GHG of 
concern, and that it is the remaining CO2 after the oceans and plants have absorbed 
most of the CO2 that is of concern.  Today, nearly everyone contributes to GHG 
emissions by driving cars, using electricity, operating factories and so on, and in 
addition, the burning of forests increases GHG and this explains why actions by man 
are central to climate change.  However human activities only produce a small 
proportion of the emissions and the Kyoto Protocol is according to API too extreme in 
it’s measures as it will drive up the cost of living and interfere with the American way 
of life.  Recent research has, according to API, shown that the increased amounts of 
carbon dioxide or other GHG in the atmosphere may be the result, rather than the 
cause, of rising temperatures.  API thus claims that the Kyoto Protocol will not 
improve the climate changes and only make life more difficult for everyone while the 
                                                 
20 Their opposition has been moderated somewhat the last few years; however this is after the decision to not 
ratify Kyoto and thus has happened outside my time frame.  I will therefore not explore their new politics 
further. 
21 http://www.api-ec.api.org/environ/index 
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environment will not gain much. Not enough is known about climate change, and until 
scientists and experts agree, it will be too drastic to enter agreements such as Kyoto.    
 
Environmental scientist Fred Singer have stated that “the climate issue is not settled; it 
is both uncertain and incomplete” (Taylor 15.09.1997) and have undermined the 
findings of the IPCC.  Considering he’s a known sceptic, his views coincide with the 
oil industry and the oil industry has promoted his scepticism to gain more support 
(ibid). 
 
The fact that there is no international consensus for accepting the accompanying 
economic costs of the Kyoto Protocol speaks against the Protocol.  If rules are broken, 
there is no international court to punish the offender, and this demands a great deal of 
trust between the signatories and has therefore worked as an argument against the 
efficiency of the Protocol.   
 
3.2.4 The politics of the oil industry 
According to Sæverud and Skjærseth (2006:4), the ambition of ExxonMobil has been 
to “hinder a strong US climate policy and put the entire Kyoto Protocol out of action 
by lobbying against any binding targets and timetables within the US”.  The oil 
industry is very familiar with lobbying and in the case of the Kyoto Protocol, Exxon 
and GCC in particular lobbied in Congress to make sure the Protocol was not ratified.  
According to Greenpeace, Exxon has spent $13 million on lobby groups and think 
tanks in order to discredit the Kyoto Protocol since 1997 (Gelbspan 2004).  In 
addition, Exxon contributed $1.2 million to the Republican Party in 2000, and is one 
of the largest contributors to the Republican Party from the oil industry22.  Since 1991, 
US oil companies have, according to Greenpeace, funded the political process with 
$53.4 million where ¾ of this was given to the Republican Party23 (Briefing 
03.12.1997 Greenpeace).   
                                                 
22 http://www.corporatewatch.com.uk/?lid=294  Influence/lobbying 
23 The numbers were presented at a Greenpeace briefing called “American Industry Against the Planet” on 
December 3rd 1997 (http:// archive.greenpeace.org/climate/kdates/december03.html).  
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3.2.5 Public mobilisation 
The oil industry, most notably Exxon and the API, have presented their sponsored 
lobbyists and think tanks in the media as independent experts who have all questioned 
the authenticity of climate change.  Exxon is a financial supporter and on the board of 
the API, and in 1998 they helped plan a $7 million public relations offensive to 
discredit the scientific consensus on the existence and threat of climate change 
(corporatewatch.org.uk).  In addition, according to Greenpeace, Exxon sponsored $13 
million in advertising campaigns which focused on developing countries are left out of 
the Kyoto Protocol (Briefing Greenpeace 03.12.1997). 
 
A poll by Newsweek (Newsweek 1997) revealed that in 1991, 35% of Americans 
considered global warming to be a serious problem, but in 1996 only 22% said the 
same. In chapter five I will present several polls on the American public’s view on 
Kyoto and global warming. 
 
The GCC has also been active in publicly dismissing the Protocol.  In 2001 they 
launched a media campaign on TV, in newspapers and in weekly periodicals that 
criticised the Protocol.  They also lobbied in Congress to persuade Senators and 
members of the House of Representatives to vote against Kyoto.   
 
The analysis chapters four and five will address the fruitfulness of the oil industry’s 
efforts in attempting to influence the public. 
 
3.2.6 Positions within the industry 
According to Skjærseth and Skodvin (2003:181-182), the response to the Kyoto 
Protocol by the US industry is, to some extent, dual.  There are indications that parts of 
the US industry did take initial steps towards a more proactive stance.  One example of 
this is the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, a US think tank.  The objective of 
the Center is to educate policymakers as well as the general public about the causes 
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and possible consequences of climate change and to encourage the domestic and 
international communities to reduce emissions of GHG.  In 2000, the Pew Center 
comprised 21 major US companies.  Today the number has risen to nearly 40.  The 
Pew Center now comprises pervious GCC members such as Shell and BP.  The 
problem, however, was that the entire US industry, including Pew members, was 
opposed to the Kyoto agreement.  Thus, not even Pew had an explicit position on the 
Kyoto Protocol, at least not initially (Skjærseth Skodvin 2003:181-182). 
Other groups which maintained a more reactive stance and disapproval of Kyoto were 
The International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association 
(IPIECA), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the International 
Climate Change Partnership (ICCP)24.  These industry lobby groups demanded more 
research and favoured voluntary programs for targets and timetables. 
 
Skjærseth and Skodvin (2003:181.182) claim that the industries felt betrayed by the 
US government, and the Government’s consent to the Protocol set off a reinforced 
mobilisation against it.  The strategy succeeded and after the withdrawal from the 
Protocol, “the international climate regime entered the doldrums” (ibid). 
 
3.2.7 Synopsis of the oil industry 
To summarise, the core arguments of API and the GCC progressed as follows; Kyoto 
is too expensive and will have too many negative consequences for the American 
public.  The GCC became an important actor in the fossil fuel lobby and was a 
representative for the opposition to amongst others the Kyoto Protocol (Skjærseth and 
Skodvin 2001: 105). The science of climate change is uncertain and climate change is 
not necessarily human induced or bad and more research must be done before the 
world should act on climate change.  The policies under discussion (at national and 
international levels) are not the best way to tackle this issue.  Instead, the oil industry 
focuses on voluntary methods of handling the climate change issue.  The oil industry 
has created their own initiatives and is sponsoring research aimed at discovering the 
                                                 
24 Governments: The Puppets of Industry?  Article in Corporate Watch 
(http://www.gpuk.org/atlantic/politics/indbr.html) 
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reasons for climate change and the best ways to tackle the issue.  President George W. 
Bush has also expressed a favourable view on this approach.  The argument given by 
the oil industry is that this is a long term process and must therefore be handled on a 
long term basis. 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Analysis of the Independent Effects on the Dependent 
Variable Influence from 1989 to 1997 
4.0 Empirical analysis 
The aim of the analysis is to determine the influence exerted by the oil industry from 
1989 to the US signing of the Kyoto Protocol.  The measurement of the dependent 
variable influence against the independent variables political mobilisation, unity, 
financial capital and public opinion is the core focus of the thesis, and the subject of 
the analyses.  By employing the four independent variables extracted from the 
discussion of theoretical perspectives in chapter two, the discussion of influence 
obtained by the oil industry will be discussed and variations on the influence 
dimension will be explored.  As stated in the introduction chapter, the study focuses on 
explaining an empirical phenomenon and thus it will be the analysis of empirical data 
measured along the independent variables that will receive the most attention.   
 
Chapter four will focus on the time frame from 1989 to the signing of the Kyoto 
Protocol.  Although comparisons will be made in chapters four and five I have chosen 
to focus the comparison of the variations in the dimensions in chapter six based on the 
data and discussion presented in chapters four and five.  
 
This chapter will be arranged as follows; first I will present an assessment of the 
positions of the industry. Then follows the analyses, divided into sub chapters for each 
variable under which the discussion of the industry will take place.  The effects of 
these variables will then be explored and measured.  The relevance of the variables 
along with their explanatory factor will also be addressed in the discussion. 
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4.1 An initial assessment of the oil industry’s involvement in climate control 
before 1997 
Before analysing the data collected in the study I will first briefly establish the 
positions of the industries, what indicators were there of their positions and what did 
they do to deal with the concept of climate change.   
 
The API, ExxonMobil and the GCC were all publicly opposed to the Protocol.  Based 
on the unitary rational actor model the industry will act in their best interest, and 
considering the American oil industry would be affected economically by the Kyoto 
Protocol in the sense they would have to change their policies and business in order to 
accommodate the Agreement, my research has shown that the industry agreed to a 
large extent that the Protocol would harm their business and thus they opposed it.  The 
analysis will discuss what actions the industry took to prevent the signing of Kyoto 
and furthermore ensure that the Protocol was not ratified.  The indicators on the oil 
industry’s position are their lobbying efforts towards policy makers, their media 
campaigns aiming at informing the public on the possible (negative) effects on Kyoto 
and their public scepticism of the Protocol.    
 
4.2 Empirical analysis of the influence of the oil industry from 1989 to 1997 
The first part of the analysis takes place before the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 
1997.  I have narrowed the time frame from the establishment of the GCC in 1989 to 
the signing in 1997, even though the climate debate has existed since the 1980’s in 
American politics.  
 I have selected this time frame in order to limit the study and also because with the 
establishment of the GCC the oil industry intensified the lobbying against climate 
control and eventually Kyoto as it was formed to prevent regulatory measures (Kolk 
and Levy 2001: 503). 
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4.2.1 Political mobilisation 
4.2.1.1 Legislative bodies 
Legislative bodies or arena access is the possibility the actors have to enter the 
decision making arena. In this study the decision making arena is the US Congress and 
the President and his administration.  Achieving access at state level may also prove 
valuable when trying to influence policy makers, however as the Kyoto Protocol 
would demand a ratification and the Protocol would become a national law, it is the 
arena at the federal level which is of most interest. 
The variable arena access derives from the discussion that took place in chapter two 
and below I will discuss its relevance and explanatory power. 
  
The way the US governmental system is structured enables industries and NGO’s 
access to the decision making arena, most notably Congress (Skjærseth and Skodvin 
2003:138).    
The US political system is highly pluralistic; individual firms and associations can 
influence many areas of legislative, administrative and diplomatic decision making 
processes.  There are numerous committees and agencies within the national 
government which possess authority on climate change policy.  The system is 
decentralised, across all levels, making climate policy important on multiple levels.  
This allows for consensus and coalition building efforts (Brewer 2003: 5) and thus 
lobbyism through allies and campaigns to effectively influence policy makers.   
Lobbying within this arena has become part of the American political culture and 
allows influence to others than politicians and lobbying is even considered to be the 
best way for actors to enter the political arena and have (or try to have) their views 
heard (Skjærseth and Skodvin 2003: 138).  The oil industry has a tradition for 
lobbying and thus, the American political system would therefore enable them access 
with a strong lobby.   
 
The lobbyist think tank groups like the GCC are groups whose members are at risk of 
losing from climate policy considering many are in the fossil fuel industry.  This could 
be a reason for them wanting to deny climate control regulations such as Kyoto 
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ratification.  As mentioned, by employing the rational actor model, if the oil industry 
was to lose money by entering Kyoto, one may presume that the industry would work 
hard to prevent this from happening. 
Along with other lobby groups within industries such as automobile and coal, the 
industry expressed concern with Kyoto and what would be potential consequences for 
the American economy.  The oil lobby would stress arguments such as potential job 
loss and increased taxes (Michaelowa 1998: 7).  Even before the establishment of the 
GCC, the oil lobby groups have opposed legally binding targets (Michaelowa 1998: 
139) though it intensified when the Kyoto negotiations commenced (Kolk and Levy 
2001: 506).  In 1995 at the Berlin Conference the GCC handed out brochures in the 
shape of passports including statements on their views on climate change though they 
usually issue unspecific statements on the matter (Michaelowa 1998: 14). 
During the Clinton Administration from 1992- 2000, environmental politics received a 
great deal of attention and President Clinton entered office with ambitious plans for 
emission reductions in the US (Christensen 2003: 3).  However, the BTU tax 
mentioned in chapter three was turned down in the Senate, according to Christensen 
due to lobbying efforts from interest groups, including the oil industry (ibid).  API 
joined forces with other industry interest groups and together they formed the 
American Energy Alliance for the sole purpose of defeating the BTU tax (Skjærseth 
and Skodvin 2003:139).  It has thus been stated that “API is considered instrumental in 
defeating the BTU tax proposal in 1992” (Christensen 2003: 13).  Skjærseth and 
Skodvin suggest that the 1992 BTU tax provoked API and ExxonMobil to such an 
extent that it strengthened their reactive stance on climate policy and climate change 
(2003:140).  The BTU tax was considered a political failure to President Clinton and 
as mentioned in chapter three, no similar tax was proposed during his presidency.  
Environmental policies had been an important part of the presidential race both in 
1988 and in 1992; however it was not an issue in 1996.  Though not necessarily linked 
to the failure of the BTU tax, while the issue of climate change was becoming an 
increasingly more important political issue internationally, it was becoming a less 
important issue in the US.  President Clinton’s defeat may have, based on the 
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perspective of political failure, made him more cautious to debate the subject.  I will 
return to this discussion in chapter five.   
 
 In addition, the Byrd-Hagel Senate resolution mentioned in chapter three denied 
ratification of international agreements excluding developing countries had the API as 
one of the “key architects” behind it (Christensen 2003:13).  In addition, Senator 
Hagel, a Republican, had close ties to the oil industry, while Senator Byrd, a 
Democrat, came from a state with great coal resources and thus a keen interest in 
maintaining the welfare of the state.  It can thus be argued that the oil industry was a 
part of the Byrd-Hagel resolution from the very beginning and were able to follow it 
through.  
The consequence of the Byrd-Hagel resolution was that it forced the Clinton 
Administration “to abandon efforts to obtain Senate ratification of the Kyoto Protocol 
(McCright and Dunlap 2003: 367). 
Even though President Clinton stated that “meaningful participation“ by developing 
countries would be eminent in the US agreeing to sign an international climate 
agreement, the Kyoto Protocol was still signed despite the fact that this was not 
achieved with the Protocol (Christensen 2003: 17- 18). 
According to an article by Bang et al (2005:1), during the Kyoto negotiations, the US 
stressed the need for flexibility in the Protocol and including as many nations as 
possible in order to keep the costs down.  The article states that “The Clinton 
Administration’s support for Kyoto was based strictly on the assumption that 
international agreement could be achieved on some of the most disputed and 
contentious issues in the Protocol: full emissions trading, joint implementation, and 
participation by developing countries” (ibid).  The US pushed for flexibility and went 
against the EU and the G7725 on several issues26.  Though Kyoto undoubtedly would 
result in large costs for the US due most importantly to the increase in emissions the 
past decades, US negotiators were forced to give up on some of their most important 
                                                 
25 The G77 consist of 77 developing countries and is the largest Third World coalition in the UN.  The group 
works to promote the economic interests of developing countries (http://www.g77.org/main/gen_info1.html). 
26 This was particularly on issues regarding developing countries.  The US insisted on stronger commitments 
from developing countries in the first Kyoto period from 2008 to 2012 
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issues (ibid).  Had it not been for the last minute visit to Kyoto by Vice President 
Gore, the US might not have accepted or signed the Protocol.  Despite their 
concessions, the US did win a few battles in the Kyoto negotiations and it has later 
been said about Kyoto that everybody got something and nobody got everything.  
Based on the perspective by Underdal presented in chapter two, the act of signing may 
have generated an interest in implementing the Protocol and considering the tough 
negotiations, it could have made the Administration work harder to ratify it.  This will 
be discussed in chapter five. 
 
In the US Congress, there was a broad opposition against the “targets and timetables” 
approach which was of most importance in the Kyoto negotiations (Bang et al 2005: 1-
2).  In addition to Congress members, influential stakeholders including the oil 
industry were against regulations of GHG emissions in the 1990’s.  According to the 
article; these firms “adopted a confrontational strategy to avoid mandatory regulations, 
involving strong political pressure and outreach campaigns to influence the public 
opinion.  The GCC and Exxon were major driving forces behind that strategy” (ibid).  
 
The oil industry did at an early stage obtain a reactive strategy towards the Kyoto 
Protocol.  The political consequences of their view is well documented and it is proven 
that “ExxonMobil’s ambition has been to hinder a strong US climate policy and put 
the entire Kyoto Protocol out of action by lobbying against any binding targets and 
timetables within the US” (Sæverud and Skjærseth 2006:4). 
 
The US oil lobby is led by API, Exxon and until its dissolvement in 2001; the GCC 
which together have actively blocked or tried to block legislation that could be 
unfavourable to the industry (Skjærseth and Skodvin 2003: 215).  Since 1993 the 
industry has won several battles in Congress, preventing climate friendly proposals 
that could potentially harm their economy from being passed (ibid).  According to 
Christensen, the anti-Kyoto lobby was “instrumental in shaping climate policy” 
(Christensen 2003: 13), indicating the influence by amongst others the oil industry on 
the issue of Kyoto. 
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The American oil industry was according to Skjærseth and Skodvin (2003: 138) 
excluded from the domestic Kyoto negotiations which led to the US support of the 
Protocol.  API made several attempts to communicate with the administration, but 
were rejected and thus concluded that the Clinton Administration was unwilling to 
cooperate with the American oil industry.  Due to Vice President Gore’s interest in 
global warming the green movement, and thus the counterbalancing forces to the oil 
industry, achieved easier access to the presidential arena.  “From 1993 to 2000, the 
Clinton- Gore Administration tried to develop a viable climate policy at home as well 
as internationally by keeping “big oil” at arms length, while consulting with the green 
movement.  This strategy proved unsuccessful because of Congressional resistance, 
partly as a result of intensive lobbying by the fossil fuel industry” (Skjærseth and 
Skodvin 2003:139).  Another reason why this strategy proved unsuccessful may be the 
1994 elections which changed the Republican Party’s situation from being a minority 
party to being a majority party holding 52.9% of all Congressional seats (with a 53% 
majority in the Senate) (McCright and Dunlap 2003: 360).  This increased the 
possibility for anti-global warming campaigns by the conservative movement (ibid) 
and one may thus assume that this could also be the case for the oil industry.  
McCright and Dunlap state that the Republican takeover had a positive effect on 
industry and that there was an increased visibility for industrial interests (2003: 363-
364).  Though the conservative movement and the oil industry are not united or known 
to actively cooperate with each other, their interests often reinforce each other 
(ibid:368). 
The Republican takeover could have been beneficial for the oil industry as the access 
to Congress may have become easier. 
 
There was in general little cooperation between industry groups and policy makers 
before the Kyoto negotiations (ibid), something that was not the case in the time span 
before the decision not to ratify the Protocol.  I will get back to this in the next chapter. 
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Although climate change had been an issue for more than a decade, it was the 
preparations and negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol that had the most influence for 
other oil companies besides Exxon (Kolk and Levy 2001:506).  Climate change 
became an issue on the agenda for the oil companies and some made public policy 
changes and started focusing on renewable energy (ibid).   
 
The relevance of this variable is based on the assumption that arena access would give 
the oil industry more influence.  Based on the facts presented above, it is evident that 
the oil industry had access to the US Congress.  Their lobbying efforts commended 
them such “victories” as the refusal of the BTU tax and the Byrd-Hagel resolution 
which made the possibility to ratify the Kyoto Protocol more difficult if not 
impossible.  By being able to access the decision making arena it would enable the 
industry to lobby their views and make themselves heard.  This would give them the 
possibility to achieve influence. 
 
The factor that President Clinton would not allow them any access to the most crucial 
decision making arena could prove to be an important element in the discussion and 
lower the industry’s score on the influence dimension.  After all; the Protocol was 
signed, despite the industry’s wishes. 
 
On the other hand, by being denied access to the president, the oil industry 
concentrated on Congress and the US Senate, where they had achieved success with 
the BTU tax before and were again able to have a resolution passed that in reality 
made ratification of the Protocol impossible.  Considering the power the US Senate 
has, it was perhaps not crucial for the industry to be able to influence the President.  In 
order for the Protocol to be ratified it had to obtain support in the Senate which at the 
time was Republican dominated.  Therefore it would appear to be of most importance 
to influence the Senate as it would have the decisive word on the matter.  As 
mentioned in chapter three, the US oil industry has been partial to the Republican 
Party while President Clinton was a Democrat.  It appears however that there was 
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disapproval from both parties concerning the Kyoto Protocol in the Senate before the 
signing.   
 
The explanatory power of this component is thus relatively strong as it shows that 
although unable to access the President, the industry achieved influence in the Senate.  
Therefore, the score on the influence dimension is relatively high, in spite of the fact 
that the Protocol was signed, the Byrd-Hagel resolution made the process more 
difficult for the Kyoto supporters.   
 
4.2.1.2 Public mobilisation 
The component public mobilisation embraces the possibility for the industries to 
penetrate American society by trying to influence their opinion on the public and thus 
influence the actions taken by the public which could prove beneficial to the oil 
industry.  It is influencing the public’s actions which are of interest in this component.  
This can be done for instance by media campaigns where the objective is to inform the 
public on a specific issue the industry is trying to gain support on and thus influence 
the public to act on it.  The theoretical perspective I presented in chapter two 
concludes that it is eminent to persuade the public in addition to legislative bodies in 
order to achieve influence.  The question is therefore which strategies did the oil 
industry use to influence the public?   
 
There are many ways of mobilising the public; however the perhaps most open and 
easiest measurable component in this variable is sponsoring of research and political 
campaigns to inform but also have the public act accordingly to the wishes of the oil 
industry. 
 
This independent variable political mobilisation argues that by mobilising the public, 
the oil industry may achieve access to legislative bodies and this way obtain influence.  
As discussed in chapter two, influencing the public to act, for instance either by voting 
for a political candidate favourable to the views of the oil industry or by having the 
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public voice their views to decision makers could potentially lead to influence for the 
oil industry. 
 
In 1994, as mentioned in 4.2.1.1, the Republicans gained a majority in both houses of 
Congress.  The oil industry had sponsored the Republicans and achieved success in 
their investments considering the Republicans took control over Congress and even 
though the President was a Democrat, the legislative body in the US was now 
Republican.  One may argue that with the aid of the oil industry, more people voted 
Republican and this way as argued in 4.2.1.1 their access to the decision makers 
increased.   
On the other hand, the Presidential election in 1996 resulted in President Clinton being 
re-elected and although the Republican majority remained the same in Congress, they 
were not able to win back the oval office.    
 
Public mobilisation is a relevant component to this particular time frame as it enabled 
the industry to mobilise the public in their direction.  The intention to mobilise the 
public and through them have the elected officials vote accordingly to the voters’ 
wishes could prove influential and give a high score on the dimension.  That would 
happen if it is proven that the elected politicians will vote according to the public and 
that the public has a clear view whether they are for or against the Protocol.  
Furthermore, if following the public opinion is of interest to members of Congress, the 
explanatory power of the theoretical perspective may be strong.   
 
Based on facts presented above and in chapter two, both the anti-Kyoto and the pro-
Kyoto movements were interested in informing the public on climate change. The 
most important counterbalancing forces to the oil industry were the green movement 
with actors such as Greenpeace working actively to inform the public on the negative 
sides of not entering the Protocol.  For the oil industry it was important to shed doubt 
on the relevance and even existence of climate change.  By making the problem appear 
smaller and question if climate change was human induced, scepticism may be raised.  
Hiring expertise supporting these views and presenting findings to the public 
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questioning the counterbalancing forces arguments could contribute to doubt being 
raised in the issue.  How to indicate influence achieved on this variable will thus be 
whether these campaigns had any effect and whether the politicians listened to what 
the public said and also if the public voted accordingly.   
 
The possibility to access legislative bodies and the effect the public could have on the 
possibility to access makes up the variable political mobilisation.  Public mobilisation 
could thus be of help to the industry in order to achieve arena access.  The question is 
thus if it would be enough without the arena access.  By supporting political 
campaigns and advertising, the public could be swayed to act according to what the oil 
industry wanted and if they were not able to achieve arena access before, by having 
favourable outcomes in the elections, this position could change.  One could argue that 
this was the case after the elections in 1994 and 1996. The Republicans took control 
over Congress, and although Kyoto was signed, Byrd-Hagel put a stop to ratification.  
Could this have happened without Republican majority?  Considering the BTU tax 
was thrown out in a Democratic majority Senate, it is possible to assume that it would 
have been difficult regardless to put a stop to Byrd-Hagel.  In addition, Byrd is as 
mentioned a Democrat.  Therefore, although the oil industry effectively was able to 
sponsor Republicans to victory, it may not have made a difference. President Clinton 
did not need the Senate’s approval to sign and although there was a Republican 
majority they were not able to prevent it.  However, through the public’s voting, the oil 
industry did gain access and in that way were able to continue the fight after the 
signing.  
 
4.2.2 Unity 
The theoretical perspective of unity in business claims industries are stronger united 
than divided.  The “potential for unity” mentioned in chapter two can be decisive for 
political effectiveness.  When less divided and better organised the possibility and 
effectiveness of promoting shared concerns is increased.  When deciding whether an 
industry is unified (using the interpretation presented in chapter two), one must first 
establish to which extent they agreed on the issue.  Then one can decide in what 
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degree the industry was unified, and if that was decisive for the outcome, meaning the 
decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.   
According to Smith; “if a sizable majority of firms maintains a collective position 
either for or against a passage (like ratifying the Kyoto Protocol), then the issue is an 
instance of business unity” (Smith 2000: 37).  The author does not specify what 
sizable is, however I have interpreted it as being a clear majority of firms, i.e. there is 
no question where the majority lies. Whether the firm’s position on the issue is weak, 
medium or strong, meaning how involved they are on the issue can be of importance.  
Additionally, their score on the unity dimension, in other words if they achieve high, 
medium or low scores on the dimension, can also have an effect on how unified the 
industry really is and how unified it appears.   
 
The American oil industry in the time span 1989 to 1997 were united in different 
degrees.  Exxon was one of the strongest opposers to Kyoto and maintained a reactive 
stance against Kyoto and climate change throughout the debate.  Other oil companies 
such as Shell and BP eventually changed towards a more proactive view.  Until 1997, 
BP was a member of the GCC, Shell left in 1998, but they remained members of the 
API.   
US based oil companies such as Texaco-Chevron and Philips-Conoco in addition to 
ExxonMobil opposed the Kyoto Protocol in this time frame, although some like 
Texaco chose a more proactive strategy than Exxon.  In other words, there was a clear 
difference between the European originated and American oil companies.  
 
According to Le Menestrel et al, the oil company BP, a member of both the GCC and 
API in 1997, changed their strategy a few months before the Kyoto Conference and 
went from representing the views of the GCC and API to recognizing the risk of 
human induced climate change based on the assessments of the IPCC (Le Menestrel et 
al 2002: 258).  However, though their official strategy changed, their investments and 
research remained the same, indicating the company did not do much different than 
ExxonMobil.  Therefore, though they publicly claimed to be different than other oil 
companies, critics claim they have remained the same (Le Menestrel et al 2002: 261). 
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The GCC being an oil industry lobby group is a good indicator on a united industry as 
it included a large portion of the industry.  However, after 1996 many of the 
companies left the GCC, first and foremost the European companies but eventually 
also the American.  This makes measurement of unity more problematic considering 
the GCC had fewer members and thus it would indicate wider opposition within the 
industry.  This is more the case for the other time frame as only BP left before the 
Kyoto negotiations were completed and considering the other industries remained 
members until after 1997, it is possible to assume that the GCC is an indication of a 
united industry before the signing of Kyoto. 
 
Additionally, there were several other well- established lobby groups within the 
industry that all worked against the ratification of the Protocol.  As mentioned in 
chapter three, IPIECA, ICC and ICCP were all against Kyoto, claiming it was too 
much too soon, and argued for the participation of developing countries.  They also 
preferred voluntary programmes and no binding measures like those in Kyoto.  They 
were however not equally persistent in their opposition.  Both the GCC and the 
IPIECA attended international climate negotiations in order to prevent or persuade 
governments to not act to hastily during the Kyoto negotiations.  The same two groups 
issued separate statements both stressing the economic consequences of the Protocol 
and along with API they expressed concerns on the impacts on trade, life style 
employment and American competitiveness in the international markets.  
 
Though it may appear that the unified position of the oil industry was about to 
experience certain challenges with several large oil companies leaving the GCC and 
changing their strategies towards climate change, the data presented above indicates 
that despite the exits from the GCC, the oil industry were before the signing of the 
Kyoto Protocol united in a fairly strong degree.  There appears to be a high degree of 
consensus as very few (if any) of the oil companies publicly supported the Protocol.  
According to McCright and Dunlap; the oil industry “was nearly unanimous in its 
denial of global warming and its rejection of any binding climate treaty” (2003: 369).  
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The research indicates that although strategies were altered before the Kyoto 
negotiations, the official stance towards Kyoto maintained sceptical.  Considering API 
represents a large portion of the American fossil fuel industry, one can thus conclude 
that the oil industry was to a large degree united. 
 
The question is then whether this lead to increased influence for the oil industry.  The 
high degree of consensus may give an indication of strength as argued in chapter two.  
A strong united industry may therefore have been able to easier obtain their objectives 
and thus achieve a high score on the influence dimension.  If that is the case, the 
explanatory factor may be deemed high as the united approach of the industry proved 
beneficial and increased their influence. 
On the other hand, a unified industry could have had very little significance.  There 
may have been other variables with greater importance like the above mentioned 
political mobilisation.  Though it is likely that a unified industry would be beneficiary 
to the oil industry, it is difficult to say whether it had any large impact on their 
achievement of influence.  Therefore the score on the influence dimension is uncertain. 
The reason for this assessment is that although it may have increased their strengths 
one may argue that it appears not to have been as decisive in the obtainment of 
influence as the perspective in chapter two indicates.    
 
4.2.3 Financial resources 
Financial resources are important in order to gain influence.  The reason is that it is 
necessary to have the finances for lobbying, media advertising and sponsoring of for 
instance research and politicians which can prove beneficiary for achieving influence. 
 
The American oil industry is one of the largest industries regardless of sector, and 
ExxonMobil is as mentioned the largest private company in the world.  It is therefore 
safe to conclude that the industry is very strong financially, meaning the industry had a 
great amount of financial resources to spend on promoting their views.  This would 
enable them to achieve the above mentioned criteria that this variable lists to possibly 
achieve influence.   
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ExxonMobil has since 1999 been one of the largest contributors to the Republican 
Party and their presidential candidates (Skjærseth and Skodvin 2003: 139).  Between 
1991 and 1996 the oil industry donated $53.4 million to election candidates, making 
this the “key channel of influence for the US fossil-fuel industry” (ibid).  Though this 
would allow them arena access, they would have to have the financial means in the 
first place, enabling this kind of sponsoring, and thus one can argue the independent 
impact and value of financial capital in the industry.  By being generous and 
supportive towards political candidates one may easier achieve access if politicians 
with similar views win elections.   
 
By owning financial capital, it enables a company, a person or an industry to sponsor 
research based on supporting their views. The oil industry sponsored scientific experts 
that were favourable to the wait and see approach, or at least agreed that the climate 
problem had a long term solution.  They could also sponsor research where the results 
would not be definitive until after the Kyoto Protocol discussion had ended.  That way, 
the result would not be admissible in the debate but it made the industry appear 
greener by claiming to sponsor climate change research. 
 
As the other variables have shown, though the industry was a powerful united lobbyist, 
they were not able to influence the US President.  Even the financial capital the 
industry bestowed did not change this fact.  Though it has been discussed earlier that 
this turned out to be of little importance, it was also the fact that the industry 
sponsored the Republican Party while the president in this time frame was a Democrat.   
 
The importance of this variable is that it may enable the industry to achieve influence 
by being able to sponsor research and perhaps most importantly political candidates 
who would vote favourable to the industry’s preferences.  Skodvin and Skjærseth as 
mentioned above even suggest that the sponsorship of the Republican candidates 
before 1996 was the most important channel for the industry in obtaining influence.  
This statement would indicate a high score on the influence dimension and 
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furthermore that the explanatory power of the theoretical perspective is quite strong in 
this time frame. 
 
4.2.4 Public opinion 
The variable public opinion explores the possibility of achieving influence the oil 
industry may have had on trying to sway the opinion of the public in their favour. 
Understanding how the oil industry can affect public opinion can lead to understanding 
of industry power (Smith 2000: 213).  According to Smith, influencing public opinion 
enables favourable policies.   
 
The GCC, ExxonMobil and API have all spent money on information regarding 
Kyoto.  In 1997, the GCC spent US$ 13 million on ads against Kyoto, claiming it 
would cost 1.5 million jobs (Michaelowa 1998: 4).  They were not alone in urging the 
public to take a negative stance against Kyoto, as mentioned API and Exxon did the 
same, along with other industries such as the automobile industry (Michaelowa 1998: 
7). 
In 1992 the GCC issued a press release titled “World’s energy should not be based on 
feelings” (Sawin and Davis 2002: 3).  Press conferences where held portraying their 
sceptical view on climate change and climate science. In addition, the findings of the 
IPCC were criticised (ibid).   
 
Exxon and Mobil merged in 1999, and both of them had been active, although in 
different degrees, in the climate debate.  In 1997 Mobil sponsored a full page ad in the 
US press criticising the fact that developing countries where excluded from 
participation and encouraging initiatives to be voluntary (ibid: 18).  In addition, the 
API ran a newspaper ad in 1997 supporting the Byrd- Hagel resolution, and 
simultaneously the US Business Round Table (BRT) ran a $1 million advertising 
campaign on climate change and supporting the Byrd-Hagel resolution (ibid).  API 
continued to sponsor media ads focusing on the potential rise in gasoline prices with 
the Kyoto Protocol.    
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API funded studies by WEFA27 studying the Clinton Administration’s proposals for 
reducing GHG emissions.  The study encourages less ambitious goals than that of 
Kyoto and in chapter five I will present more of the WEFA study from 1998 which 
criticises Kyoto thoroughly.   
 
The GCC has been a major lobbying organisation against Kyoto, and emissions 
control in general (targets and timetables) and has publicly disputed the works of the 
IPCC, while API have challenged the US National Academy of Sciences, both on 
climate change issues (Brewer 2003: 12-13).  
 
In addition to the arguments of potential higher unemployment rate and the criticism 
of developing countries being left out, the GCC also argued that the US sovereignty 
was at risk.  During the Kyoto negotiations, the GCC produced a press briefing 
claiming that the UN would take control over the US economic growth (Sawin and 
Davis 2002:17).  This would, according to the briefing, result in a take-over by the UN 
regardless whether the Protocol was ratified or not as long as it was signed (ibid).  As 
mentioned earlier, Americans can be sceptical to intervention from foreign bodies and 
therefore this could prove to be effective measures to achieve the support of the public 
in preventing the signing of the Protocol. 
 
At the time of the signing, few people were aware of the Kyoto Protocol and thus had 
little or no indication of what they thought of the subject.  Environmental issues were 
on the political as well as the media’s agenda but not the view the public had on the 
Kyoto Protocol specifically.  There were however made surveys on the public’s view 
on climate change.  The magazine Newsweek (1997) polled the American public in 
1991 and 1996 on Americans view on global warming.  In 1991 35% of the public saw 
global warming as a serious problem, but in 1996 22% answered the same.  This was 
despite the fact that more research had been done documenting human induced climate 
change, and the focus on climate change had in general increased in the American 
                                                 
27 WEFA (Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates) joined forces with DRI (Data Resources Inc) to form 
Global Insight in 2002, an economic and financial forecasting company whose projects often are sponsored by 
API (http://www.globalinsight.com/about).   
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media and politics.  Although these polls do not say anything about the public’s view 
on the Kyoto Protocol, it still gives an indication that global warming was not 
considered to be a priority issue amongst the public.   
 
According to API and GCC, the American economy would suffer, their 
competitiveness towards other states not involved in Kyoto would be reduced and gas 
prices would go up.  The uncertainty the impact of emissions reductions might have on 
the economy was one of the main arguments used by the oil industry (Christensen 
2003:11).  Though it appears obvious that the oil industry would suffer financially, 
their arguments included how the Protocol would affect American way of life.  Not 
only would there be higher gas prices, energy consumption would have to go down 
and that would affect the American public28.  
The most important argument presented from these actors was perhaps the argument 
that climate change could not be confirmed as a threat and that it could not be proved 
to be human induced.  Though ExxonMobil has stated that global warming is a 
“legitimate concern” (Christensen 2003: 13), the company has been reluctant in 
acknowledging human induced climate change (ibid).  This argument has been linked 
to economic reasons for not entering the Protocol as proactive measures would 
according to ExxonMobil be costly (ibid).  By presenting their own research and 
specialist on the field they raised questions on the validity of climate change and urged 
for more research before committing agreements were signed. By expressing doubt on 
the issue, it may be assumed that API and GCC were attempting to influence the 
public’s view on the issue and raise scepticism on the topic. Furthermore, API and 
GCC publicly discredited the findings of the IPCC and other research whose 
conclusions were unfavourable to the oil industry (Christensen 2003:13).   
 By having the public on their side, the oil industry might appear stronger and 
according to the theoretical framework presented in chapter two, having the public 
opinion on their side could lead to influence alone or combined with other factors.   
 
                                                 
28 Views expressed by API on their web page http://api-ec.api.org/environ/index.   
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The $13 million media campaign mentioned above was according to Andresen and 
Agrawala (1999: 478) perhaps not as effective as intended.  In November 1997, a 
national survey found that only 8% of the public had seen the advertisements and 2% 
claimed to be more against Kyoto after viewing the advertisement.  67% answered that 
efforts to reduce GHG emissions would instead help the US economy (ibid).  Though 
these numbers may not be presented as facts, they are an indication that despite their 
efforts, the media campaigns had little effect on the public.  These findings correspond 
with the polls presented in chapter three and above which also indicate a favourable 
public opinion on Kyoto. 
 
If the opinion of the public is the opposite of the oil industry then the explanatory 
power of this variable can be deemed weak.  It would then appear that the oil industry 
would have to achieve influence on a different dimension and thus the score on the 
influence dimension will here be low for the oil industry.  Considering the US signed 
the Protocol, the views of the public opinion prevailed and that could be an indication 
to the oil industry that in order to achieve its goal on non ratification, the public would 
have to be persuaded. 
 
4.3 Synopsis of the empirical analysis 1989 to 1997 
The discussion that has taken place in this analysis has searched to obtain a score on 
the influence dimension.  Through the independent variables the analysis searched to 
find the explanatory power of the theoretical perspectives and whether they might give 
an explanation as to the oil industry’s achievement of influence. 
 
Though excluded from the inner presidential circle, API, GCC and ExxonMobil 
interpreted this as unwillingness from the Clinton Administration to include them in 
the debate and perhaps because of this, or for other reasons, focused on lobbying in 
Congress.  The unanimous vote to pass the Byrd-Hagel resolution made the Kyoto 
Protocol in theory impossible to ratify.  They were thus able to access the political 
arena and the variable political mobilisation can be argued to give a high score on the 
influence dimension as they were able to access the Senate.  The fact that they were 
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not able to access the President could make the score lower, however due to the 
American political system, lobbying can prove quite influential and considering the 
president would need a 2/3 majority in the Senate to ratify the Protocol, the oil 
industry felt confident in the fate of the Kyoto Protocol and never established a Plan B 
(Skjærseth and Skodvin 2003: 204) in case the Protocol was ratified.  This was 
regardless of the outcome of the presidential election and thus the explanatory factor 
of the component public mobilisation may be argued to be low.  However, influence 
was argued to have been achieved within the other component legislative bodies and 
therefore the score is deemed high on the independent variable political mobilisation. 
 
Regarding the unity variable, the industry appeared unified through their coalition in 
the GCC and membership in API.  Considering most oil companies were involved in 
these groups and both groups were against Kyoto, the industry gave the appearance of 
a united industry.  However, in 1996 companies started leaving the GCC and then the 
unified stance was weakened.  The first to leave were the European companies and in 
addition, oil companies such as BP and Shell changed their strategy and gained a more 
proactive stance.  BP’s changed happened right before the Kyoto negotiations and was 
an inspiration to Shell to do the same.  This resulted in support but also wide criticism 
from environmental NGO’s.  However, this became more evident after the Kyoto 
Protocol was signed and is thus more applicable for the next chapter.  Considering the 
American oil companies maintained their membership in the GCC within this time 
frame their united approach appears unaffected despite the exits.  One may conclude 
that the industry was united before the signing in spite of the fact that there were 
internal splits towards the end.  The score on the influence dimension was deemed to 
be uncertain as it was not possible to prove that it had had any effect on the industry 
obtaining influence. On the other hand it is likely that the united approach from the 
American industry gave the impression of being a strong and therefore influential 
industry and thus one can not rule out the possible impact of a united industry. 
 
The independent variable financial resources of the oil industry does not need to be 
questioned.  In the 1990’s the industry started their public campaign in informing the 
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public on their views as well as the sponsoring of political candidates grew larger.  The 
sponsoring of political candidates was argued to have been influential in the oil 
industry’s achievement of influence.  The theoretical perspective used to create this 
variable suggests that these financial resources may empower the industry and thus 
make it easier to achieve access to the decision making arena as well as sponsor 
information campaigns for the public.  Additionally, financial resources enable the 
possibility to sponsor research on the topic, something the oil industry did.  It also 
makes it possible to sponsor sceptical scientists to publicly speak on the matter.  The 
research I have done indicate that the oil industry would in this case use experts that 
were favourable to their view, in other words were against Kyoto and were 
downplaying the threats of climate change.  Financial resources may thus have a high 
score on the influence dimension as it enables the industry to provide their own 
research, present their own results and ultimately sponsor the candidates most likely to 
have concurring views on important issues.  Furthermore it permits them to sponsor 
campaigns that inform and even persuade the public to concur with the industry, and 
perhaps even vote accordingly on Election Day.  The explanatory power may thus be 
deemed strong as it can explain how the industry achieved influence and to what 
extent it enabled them to achieve more influence.  
 
The last independent variable public opinion indicate that despite millions of dollars 
spent on advertisement and media campaigns, the public opinion remained favourable 
to Kyoto.  It was even suggested that the public viewed reduction in GHG emissions as 
beneficial to the US economy.  One can thus conclude that in this variable, the oil 
industry were not able to influence public opinion and considering the public were 
positive to Kyoto and the Protocol was signed, the oil industry achieved a low score on 
the influence dimension.  However, the explanatory power of this variable may be 
high if one assumes that the President went with the wishes of the public and not the 
industry.  This would then indicate that in order to deny ratification of Kyoto, the 
public would have to be on the same side as the oil industry and thus it would be 
within this variable they might achieve success in the next round. 
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Chapter 5: Empirical Analysis of the Independent Effects on the Dependent 
Variable Influence from 1997 to 2001 
 
5.1 An initial assessment of the oil industry’s involvement in climate control 
between 1997 and 2001 
The oil industry’s involvement after the signing of the Kyoto Protocol maintained the 
same level as before the signing.  As this chapter will show, API, GCC and 
ExxonMobil upheld its scepticism of Kyoto and continued to inform politicians and 
the public of the potential negative sides of Kyoto as well as encouraging voluntary 
measures instead of binding limits as established in the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
5.2 Empirical analysis of influence achieved between 1997 and 2001 
The second part of the analysis takes place in the time frame after the signing of the 
Kyoto Protocol.  At the time of the signing the US President was as mentioned in the 
previous analysis in favour while there were strong objections to the Protocol in the 
Senate.  The oil industry thus would have to ensure this objection was maintained in 
the Senate and this part of the analysis will study whether the oil industry had any 
influence in the decision not to ratify the Protocol. 
 
One of the most important events that took place in this time frame is the presidential 
election in 2000 which ended with victory for the Republican candidate George W. 
Bush.  Whether this event was a decisive factor or not will be explored further in the 
analysis. 
 
The theoretical perspectives and independent variables remain the same from the 
previous chapter and I will therefore not give any further explanation as to what they 
are and why they were chosen considering this was done in chapters two and four. 
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5.2.1 Political mobilisation 
5.2.1.1 Legislative bodies 
Although the oil industry had been “defeated” in the sense that the Kyoto Protocol was 
signed despite their objections, the oil industry had achieved one important victory 
with the unanimous approval of the Byrd-Hagel resolution.  The challenges facing the 
oil industry for the years after the signing would be to maintain this view in the Senate 
and make sure that ratification of Kyoto would not take place.  During this time frame, 
there would be a presidential election.  Before the election it was assumed that the 
Democratic candidate Al Gore, who was the Vice President during the Clinton 
Administration, would push to ratify the Protocol while the Republican candidate 
George W. Bush would probably not push for ratification.  Considering the first had a 
low standing in the Senate and thus would face stronger opposition while the latter had 
a higher standing in the Senate, it would appear that the oil industry had been dealt the 
highest cards (Skjærseth and Skodvin 2001: 106).   
 
As presented in Chapter three; Byrd-Hagel resolution of 1997 had Senator Robert 
Byrd as one of the key players in the drafting and making of the resolution.  Senator 
Byrd represented West Virginia, a state that had always been a democratic state, 
meaning Democratic presidential candidates would always win West Virginia in the 
election.  During the presidential election in 2000, the coal industry, which is very 
strong in West Virginia, was able through tough lobbyism to convince electors to vote 
for a Republican candidate for the first time in history.  Though there was great 
discussion on the result of the election due to the problems and confusion in Florida, 
however, regardless of the result in Florida, George W. Bush would still have won due 
to the republican win in West Virginia (Bang et al 2005: 3).   
 
According to an article in The Australian, the coal industry in West Virginia supported 
Bush because of his resistance to Kyoto (The Australian 25.01.2002).  According to 
Skjærseth and Skodvin, due to the Byrd-Hagel resolution, the Kyoto Protocol was 
considered dead on arrival in the Senate, regardless the outcome of the presidential 
election in 2000 (Skjærseth and Skodvin 2003: 215).  Therefore, the lobbying that led 
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to this resolution might have been an indicator as to how influence was achieved.  
Without support in the Senate, the executive branch would be unable to ratify Kyoto.   
 
The possibility for political failure could, according to the framework presented in 
chapter two, be a possible determining factor.  President Clinton never submitted the 
Kyoto Protocol for ratification.  Considering Clinton had already suffered a defeat 
with the BTU tax, one may argue that he was unwilling to suffer a similar defeat.  Due 
to Byrd-Hagel there was a large chance it would have been thrown out immediately 
and thus to avoid the failure of proposing Kyoto ratified, President Clinton left it to his 
successor.  Based on the theoretical perspective in chapter two, the signing of the 
Kyoto Protocol may have lead to a stronger willingness to ratify the Protocol.  This 
does not seem to be the case and considering Democratic candidate Al Gore had a low 
standing in the Senate, it appears it would have been a challenge for him to have the 
Protocol ratified had he been elected.  
 
In chapter four it was established that the oil industry was not able to achieve access to 
the presidential circle although they were able to lobby in Congress.  The Congress 
held at the time a Republican majority and the Republican Party in general opposed 
the Kyoto Protocol.  After the election, the Republicans gained the Presidency and 
maintained their majority in Congress.   
 
President Bush was early on named The Oil Man from Texas.  His history with 
American oil companies29, along with several of his political associates would suggest 
support to the oil industry.   In addition to the President, Vice President Dick Cheney, 
National Security Advisor (and after 2004 Secretary of State) Condoleezza Rice and 
Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans all had backgrounds in the oil industry.  Cheney 
as the former CEO of Halliburton, the largest oil-field services in the US, Rice served 
on Chevron’s board of directors while Evans worked for a Denver oil and gas 
company (Gelbspan30).  API was also represented in the Administration with Philip 
                                                 
29 George W. Bush was the executive of the oil company Arbusto Energy before his political career.   
30 Excerpt from Boiling Point by Ross Gelbspan (http://www.grist.org/advice/books/2004/07/21/gelbspan-
boiling/). 
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Cooney, former head of the climate unit in API became chief of staff for the White 
House Council on Environmental Quality (ibid).  Cooney left the post to work for 
ExxonMobil in 200531.  Based on these facts, it is perhaps not surprising that the Bush 
Administration had a different approach to the issue of climate change than the 
previous administration.   
 
Recently, the chairman of the Senate Environment Committee, Senator James Inhofe 
stated that “With all of the hysteria, all of the fear, all of the phoney science, could it 
be that man-made global warming is the greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the 
American people?  It sure sounds like it” (Evans 200532).  Even though this statement 
was made in 2005, it is still characteristic of the views shared by Republicans 
throughout the process of the signing and decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.   
 
Though the representation of former oil industry executives in the Administration does 
not necessarily give the oil industry more influence, it could have given them more 
access to the presidential circle.  According to Skjærseth and Skodvin (2003: 140) the 
situation turned around completely when the Bush-Cheney administration took office 
in 2001 and the green movement was excluded whereas energy industry leaders, most 
importantly ExxonMobil achieved access to the policy making arena.  In fact, after the 
Bush administration took office, ExxonMobil and the administration had similar or 
almost identical interests.  In addition, because of his already mentioned background, 
Vice President Cheney allowed energy firms a great deal of access to him directly as 
well as other key government officials. 
 
The US had already, before the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, introduced strict 
environmental regulations, and the API estimated it would be spending $ 26-33 billion 
annually to comply with the regulations (Skjærseth and Skodvin 2003:137).  Another 
important factor in the Senators’ disapproval of the Protocol is the lack of participation 
                                                 
31 According to a story done by 60 Minutes aired March 29th 2006, Cooney edited scientific government reports 
to make climate change seem less severe and stressed the uncertainty and doubt facing the topic.  According to 
the story, scientists are being censored to give complying views with the Bush Administration.   
32 www.bbc.co.uk  07.10.2005   
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from the developing countries.  The US does not approve of agreements that could 
result in less favourable business competition for the US.  Considering many of the 
developing countries have large CO2 emissions, it was not difficult to achieve support 
on this matter.  This enabled the industry to call the Protocol unfair as it would give 
the developing countries benefits in the international trade community. This view was 
shared by President George W. Bush who publicly admitted that this was one of the 
reasons for his decision not to ratify the Protocol.  The argument that developing 
countries must first be able to achieve the same grounds for competition, something 
they quite possibly would have been unable to do had they been bound by the Kyoto 
Protocol, was not bought by the American politicians.  They still considered the 
developing countries not needing to comply with the Kyoto regulations to be a 
potential threat for American business.  One can thus question whether the industry 
actually had influence or whether it was just that their interests coincided with that of 
the Administration.   
 
The industry has spent money and time to undermine the credibility of climate science 
and the outcomes of the IPCC.  President Bush has also publicly stated that he will 
“not accept an international accord to reduce heat-trapping emissions”33.  Even though 
the top officials in EPA were appointed by the President, and that there was a large 
(and rather unusual) consensus amongst the scientific community that global warming 
was caused by emissions from automobiles, power plants and oil refineries to name a 
few, the President maintained his stance that there was not enough scientific evidence 
to link global warming to industrial emissions (ibid).  Though this report was 
published after the President’s decision not to ratify Kyoto, it is a good indicator of 
how the views of the oil industry and the Administration were in coherence.   
 
Shortly after the President had decided not to ratify the Protocol; the US Chamber of 
Commerce wrote a letter to the President thanking him for his leadership on 
environmental issues and his decision on Kyoto (letter from CEO of Chamber of 
                                                 
33 www.planetark.org  05.06.2002 
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Commerce Donohue 04.05.2001).  By having the business community on his side, 
there seemed to be no good reason to change his decision.   
 
The score on the influence dimension can be argued is high in this time frame.  The oil 
industry achieved a great deal of access to the inner presidential circle.  Considering 
they had not been able to achieve this in the previous administration, it is possible to 
assume that their score on the influence dimension has increased.  Through donations 
to the Party and lobbying efforts the oil industry was able to influence the policy 
makers.  According to an article in Grist, a briefing note from the White House states 
that Bush rejected the Kyoto Protocol in part due to input from the GCC34.  
If that is the case, the oil industry managed to score high on the influence dimension as 
it contributed to President Bush’s decision not to ratify the Protocol.   
The explanatory power of the theoretical perspectives can be argued as relatively 
strong.  Arena access did empower the industry and as they achieved more access, they 
also achieved more influence.   
 
5.2.1.2 Public mobilisation 
Having led the Republicans to victory in 1994 Congress election and maintaining that 
majority in 1996, the Republicans won the presidential election in 2000.  As 
mentioned earlier in the chapter, the American oil industry sponsored the presidential 
campaign of George W. Bush and the result was victory.  Through the votes of the 
public, the oil industry was now able to access the decision making arena and as 
argued above were able to access the inner most circle.  One may thus argue that the 
public acted the way the industry had hoped and thus they were able to achieve their 
ultimate goal. 
 
Combined with the component legislative bodies this variable indicated a high score 
on the influence dimension as the industry achieved its goal and were able to access all 
levels of the decision making arena.  However, could this have happened without the 
mobilisation of the public?  Earlier in the study it is mentioned that the oil industry 
                                                 
34 http://www.grist.org/news/daily/2005/06/08/1/ 
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never established a plan B as they were certain that the Kyoto Protocol would never be 
ratified.  This indicates that regardless of the outcome and how the public voted; the 
Protocol would not have been ratified.  This has been argued before because of Byrd-
Hagel and Al Gore’s low standing in Congress if elected and so it appears the oil 
industry was facing a win-win situation, regardless of how the people voted.  In that 
case, this component will not have strong explanatory power as it was not the actions 
of the oil industry that lead to this result but other factors with stronger explanatory 
value.  The public might have had very different incentives for electing Bush 
regardless of how they felt about his environmental policies. 
 
One may also ask whether it would be beneficial for the oil industry to mobilise the 
American public to act accordingly to their wishes.  Considering there are indications 
of a favourable opinion on Kyoto amongst the American public, mobilising them to act 
may not be in the oil industry’s best interest.  Instead, making sure other issues 
achieved more attention in the political debates and turn the focus away from the 
Kyoto debate might be a better option for the oil industry.  That way they could 
indirectly obtain their goal.  In the 2000 elections, environmental policies received 
little attention.  According to Olmos et al (2000: 4) the environment ranked ninth out 
of fourteen issues in the presidential campaign and of the environmental issues global 
warming was ranked second to last.  This could be argued to be beneficial for the oil 
industry if a majority of the public supported Kyoto.   
 
The variable political mobilisation can be deemed to have strong explanatory power 
despite one component being stronger than the other.  There are indications that the 
Protocol was rejected due to the advice of the GCC and the fact that Bush and many 
members of the Administration were former oil executives.  Therefore, the variable 
would give a high score on the influence dimension as it was in fact the influence of 
the industry which lead to the final decision.  
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5.2.2 Unity  
The picture of a unified industry became slightly modified with the exits of both BP 
and Shell from the GCC although the industry seemed united in the disapproval of the 
signing of the Protocol.  After the signing had taken place, did they remain united or 
did any of the oil companies have a change of heart? 
 
As mentioned there is great difference between the European oil industry and the 
American oil industry.  While most European oil companies have started extensive 
research on more climate friendly alternatives to oil, it appears that the American oil 
industry is maintaining their business as usual, and has yet to change their business 
and policy on climate change, regardless that their quest to prevent the US from 
signing the Protocol failed.  This seems to particularly be the case with API and 
ExxonMobil.  ExxonMobil has not changed their politics towards climate change the 
past 10 years (Kolset 2004: 4) and has for this reason as well as its general reluctance 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions been referred to as a “dinosaur company” 
(Rowlands 2000: 344) .  The strategy of API and ExxonMobil is a defensive approach 
towards the issue of climate change, demanding more information on the matter before 
anything is done, and creating scepticism towards scientific studies on human induced 
climate change.  The oil industry’s lobby group is quite large in this area as I have 
previously mentioned, and there’s a lot of expertise and experience with lobbying in 
the industry.  In addition, the oil industry has had more experience with lobbying as a 
means of influencing policy makers.  They have employed lobbying to raise doubt 
about the scientists’ claims that climate change was human induced.  By creating 
uncertainty about scientific facts (or scientific studies), and maintaining a stance that 
climate change was not human induced, but a natural change by nature itself, it would 
be easier to generate accept on their views and create scepticism towards the Kyoto 
Protocol.  In addition, the oil industry focuses on presenting their own initiatives, 
managing to create an environmental friendly picture of them despite of the fact that 
they are against the Protocol.   
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I have not been able to find information on action taken to fight for the Protocol by the 
oil industry.  Even the members of the Pew Center were against the Protocol.  In fact, 
the entire industry in the US agreed on the disapproval of Kyoto.  In that sense, it can 
be concluded that the industry was united, did this lead to influence?   
It appears that the lobbying in the industry was one- way meaning it is only focused on 
one side of a matter. If all the lobbying was focused on fighting the Protocol, it would 
make the impression of a united industry.  In any case, even if there were 
disagreements, they were kept under a tight lid.  API’s public scepticism of the 
Protocol has perhaps been influential and the united attempt by the oil industry to raise 
concern regarding the Protocol appears to have worked.  
 
The explanatory power of the unity perspective may thus be deemed strong regardless 
of the fact that oil companies left the GCC.  Although there were internal 
disagreements within the industry on how the issue on climate change should be dealt 
with and that while ExxonMobil and the API remained reactive, other companies 
changed their strategy in a more proactive direction.  Nevertheless the view on Kyoto 
remained in a large degree the same for most of the oil companies and thus one may 
argue that the industry was united on this matter and that there was a general 
agreement to be against a ratification of the Protocol. 
On the other hand, when API launched an anti Kyoto campaign, BP withheld money in 
protest and announced they did not want their name linked to the advertising campaign 
(Rowlands 2000.345).  Nevertheless they remained members although they were 
sceptical of the official API view.  BP Amoco was one of the founding members of the 
Pew Center and was more proactive than the other companies; however it does not 
appear to have altered the united appearance the oil industry gave. 
 
When deciding what indications the unified appearance has on the influence 
dimension one must decide based on the facts presented whether the unified stance 
resulted in more influence.  According to this theoretical perspective more influence 
would be the outcome with a unified appearance.   
 
 75
Chapter 5                                                                                                              Analysis Part 2                         
A strong, collected industry will come across as stronger than an industry divided.  
Whether it was decisive for the outcome is however a different question.  According to 
Rowlands, Exxon was deliberately “working with like-minded companies to advance 
its position” (Rowlands 2000:343).  This can be interpreted as an attempt by Exxon to 
unite with other companies to achieve influence.  This again might indicate that they 
thought a more united approach would increase their influence.   
 
In chapter four it was difficult to draw any conclusions based on the facts presented 
and the following discussion.  It would appear that the oil industry was less united now 
than before the signing.  More companies left the GCC and proactive strategy became 
a favourable approach to the European as well as some of the American oil companies.  
Therefore, it is difficult to establish the score on the influence dimension in this 
variable.  Even though they were more divided, they were to a large extent unified in 
the scepticism of Kyoto.  Or, those that changed their minds were less vocal in their 
support.  Regardless, measuring the score of influence is for those reasons difficult as 
it is difficult to establish whether they achieved less influence due to a weaker GCC 
and a more proactive stance in the industry, if their influence in this variable remained 
the same or if it increased. 
 
5.2.3 Financial resources 
The oil industry maintained their campaign that had only one main objective, to kill 
any possibility of implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.  Like the previous time 
frame, ExxonMobil continued to be one of the most generous political donors in the 
US and was the largest contributor to the Bush campaign followed by Enron and BP.  
Considering George W. Bush won the election, one may argue that their financial 
contributions paid off. 
 
According to an article in BBC News (Evans 200535), ExxonMobil has donated 
substantial amounts of money to American organisations like Advancement of Sound 
Science Centre Inc.  The article claims that these organisations are officially concerned 
                                                 
35 http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/magazine/4319574.stm 07.10.2005 
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with global warming, however their research undermines the science of global 
warming and they are against Kyoto ratification (ibid).  Furthermore, ExxonMobil has 
donated an extensive amount of money to Stanford University to fund long-term 
research on new energy technology (ibid).  The oil industry maintains that they are not 
against the climate change research and they do not deny its existence, however they 
are against acting too quickly.  By sponsoring extensive research for the future, they 
claim one can be more confident in the conclusions reached.  Actually, there are many 
who believe that the oil industry’s approach is preferable; after all, the climate change 
problem is a long term problem, so why does the solution have to be short term?  
Critics of the oil industry’s approach might interpret this as an attempt to procrastinate 
the global warming discussion, while others agree that the long term approach is the 
correct way to go.   
The GCC used from the beginning experts well known for their scepticism towards 
climate change who questioned whether global warming was a fact and whether 
climate change was human induced.  The experts of the GCC would at press 
conferences undermine the credibility of climate science and outcomes of the IPCC.   
 
While the European companies have started focusing on environmental friendlier and 
economic beneficial alternatives, the American companies still maintain the stand that 
they and the public will lose out if climate change measures were introduced.  As 
mention earlier, the American fear of unequal competitive grounds and their 
businesses losing out is planted firmly within their policies.  Therefore, they will rarely 
support any agreement that could possibly reduce their international competitiveness.  
In addition, the US is one of the largest users of energy in the world and they are 
dependent on cheap energy to maintain the “American way of life”.  Americans 
depend on cars due to the great distances within the country and they are not very 
eager to agree on augmented gasoline prices or similar tax increases.   
 
The variable financial resources remain constant on the influence dimension.  The 
amount of financial resources remained the same and they were to a large extent 
utilised in the same manner as before 1997.  Therefore, the variable can be argued to 
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achieve a high score on the influence dimension as it continued to enable them 
sponsoring of research and political candidates.   
 
5.2.4 Public opinion 
In Chapter four I discussed that the oil industry spent large resources on media 
campaigns in order to persuade the public to be more favourable to the views of the oil 
industry.   
 
Between 1997 and 2001 the API approached the American public quite vigorously, 
painting a grim picture of the American economy if the US entered the Kyoto 
Protocol.  In 1998 they sponsored a study by WEFA called Global Warming: The 
High Cost of the Kyoto Protocol (WEFA 1998) which stipulated the cost of 2.4 
million jobs in the US and emphasized the lack of obligations to the developing 
countries.  The published report systematically goes through a long line of arguments 
which conclude with pessimistic prospects for the US if the Protocol is implemented 
(WEFA 1998).  Though they separate themselves from their sponsor API, the views of 
API and the study by WEFA coincide, as job loss, raise in gasoline prices, the lack of 
participation from developing countries, reduced competitiveness for US companies 
and reduction in household income are presented as some of the most important 
arguments in rejecting Kyoto (ibid: 1). The study emphasizes the possibility for 
alternative options to Kyoto and the fact that Kyoto would not prove to be beneficial 
(ibid: 12). 
 
As mentioned in chapter four, the US Senate was from the beginning very sceptical of 
the Protocol and promptly after President Clinton signed the Protocol, sceptical 
reactions by US Senators were expressed.  In the International Harold Tribune (29 
December 1998), it was stated that the Senate has misread the American public, which 
in surveys have expressed support for Kyoto.  According to the article, the public 
support also includes cooperating with the UN to combat global warming threats.  One 
may thus argue that the public opinion appears to be in contradiction to that of the US 
Senate. 
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There have been made several surveys on the American people’s views on the Kyoto 
Protocol and their views on global warming.  The first poll I will present is a poll 
conducted by Wirthlin Worldwide for the GCC that shows strong opposition towards 
the Protocol and that the voters demanded more research before the US committed 
itself to the agreement.  Although the respondents believe that climate change exists, 
84% would like to wait and see scientists conduct extensive research “before we limit 
ourselves as to what we can or cannot do as an industrialised nation” (Wirthlin Report: 
4). 
 Simultaneously the survey shows that a clear majority of respondents support 
voluntary programs to reduce emissions.  One of the reasons suggested for the 
respondents’ objection towards the Protocol is that with the economy on the rise (at the 
time of the survey), Americans are sceptical of ratifying a treaty that could threaten 
their standard of living (Cooler Heads Coalition 1998).  Considering the surveys were 
made on behalf of coalitions in strong disapproval of the Protocol, it is perhaps not to 
be taken as seriously as more neutral surveys. 
 
In a poll made by The Harris Poll (1997) immediately after the Kyoto negotiations in 
1997, 75% backed the Protocol while 21% opposed.  It is necessary to point out that of 
those surveyed only 55% were aware of the Kyoto negotiations.  In another Harris poll 
in 2001, 70% of the people who answered supported the Protocol while 22% opposed 
it.  18% answered it was too strict and 41% said it was just right, while 31% said it 
was not strict enough. In other words, the public opinion had according to The Harris 
Poll remained consistent.   
 
Another survey favourable to Kyoto was made by the University of Oregon’s Survey 
Research Laboratory in 2003 (University of Oregon June 03.06.2003) where of those 
Americans who had heard of global warming, a strong majority (88%) supported the 
Protocol.  However, when asked about gasoline tax, a clear majority (78%) were 
against it, indicating that although in favour of reducing climate change, they might 
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not be willing to increase taxes and change their standards of living in order to 
improve the environment. 
 
It is difficult to derive any specific conclusion from these polls as one must be careful 
to present it as facts, but instead use it as an indication of which direction the public 
were heading.  The surveys presents different result, in some Americans favour the 
Protocol and demand action taken against global warming and climate change and in 
others it is concluded with the opposite.  A surprising finding in the poll by University 
of Oregon (ibid) was the bipartisan support, in other words, there was little difference 
between Democrats and Republicans on the issue.  One must however analyse these 
surveys critically as people have a tendency to answer more politically correct than 
perhaps their views really are.  It is easy to say you support environmental friendly 
agreements, but many might answer differently when asked to reduce their driving and 
experience tax increase as a result of the agreement.   
 
The oil industry, with Exxon and API in charge, continued to spearhead campaigns to 
influence the public to go against ratification of the Protocol.  Exxon ran advertising 
campaigns in the US to create scepticism towards the Protocol.  As presented in 
chapter three, in 1998, API spent $7 million on a public relations offensive to 
undermine scientific consensus on the threat of climate change.  They publicly stated 
that those favourable towards the Protocol were “out of touch with reality”.  
The cost of the Kyoto Protocol remained a large issue amongst those against the 
Protocol, including the oil industry.  Their worries were introduced to the public as the 
costs of Kyoto would according to the oil industry affect everyone. 
In a congress hearing (105th Congress, 2nd Session. House Hearing), Republican Joe 
Knollenberg presented numbers based on the estimation by WEFA on the cost of 
Kyoto.  According to Knollenberg, gasoline would go up 50 cents a gallon and would 
result in more than one million job losses a year for the next 15 years. 
 
Despite their efforts, it appears that there was little change in public opinion.  
Considering the oil industry was still able to prevent Kyoto from ratification, it 
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questions the relevance of this variable.  Considering the American public in general 
were favourable to Kyoto one may assume that President Bush went against the wishes 
of the public and therefore the oil industry would not need to persuade the public in 
order to reach their objectives.  Therefore the variable has low explanatory factor and 
scores low on the influence dimension. 
 
5.3 Synopsis Analysis 1997- 2001 
The oil industry had before the signing of the Protocol managed to build a strong 
coalition and lobby in Congress as well as sponsoring political candidates, media 
campaigns and independent research on climate change. 
 
In the time frame 1997 (after the signing in December) to 2001 the industry obtained a 
tighter grip on the access to decision makers in Congress and eventually after the 
election in 2000, in the Bush Administration as well. The industry continued to 
publicly criticise and raise questions about the Kyoto Protocol. To sum up the 
arguments and facts presented in the first independent variable, the oil industry 
receives a high score on the influence dimension as they did contribute to the decision 
not to ratify Kyoto.  The relevance of the theoretical perspectives have proved 
themselves high as the two components in the variable to a different degree could 
serve as explanatory factors to the dependent variable influence.  Though one perhaps 
stronger than the other, the component legislative bodies appears quite valuable in 
explaining the achievement of influence, as arena access can be argued achieved a 
high score.  The component public mobilisation proved difficult to measure as there 
could have been other factors explaining the actions of the public.  Although they 
voted accordingly to the wishes of the oil industry, the result may be due to other 
factors irrespective of the Kyoto debate and the oil industry’s interference. 
Nevertheless, based on the discussion in this chapter, the variable political 
mobilisation as a whole served as a strong explanatory factor and scored high on the 
influence dimension. 
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As for unity, the score appears to be slightly smaller as there were indications that the 
industry was less united in this time frame compared to the previous.  Still, the 
appearance of being united held forth and though the industry had different opinions as 
to how climate change could be managed and whether they were reactive or proactive, 
it still appears that the industry as a whole was against the Protocol.  The measuring of 
unity became problematic when companies left the GCC and more climate friendlier 
coalitions as the Pew Center were established.  However, considering it appears they 
all took a public stance against Kyoto, one may establish a certain unity in the industry 
although establishing a score on the influence dimension proved difficult.  
 
As in the analysis in chapter four, there was never any discussion as to the financial 
strength of the industry. The oil industry is one of the strongest industries financially, 
and with ExxonMobil being the largest private company in the world, their financial 
resources were unquestionable.  The discussion was thus how it was employed to gain 
influence and whether this proved effective and helped give the industry a higher score 
on the influence dimension.  The sponsoring of republican candidates in Congress as 
well as being the largest sponsor of the Republican Presidential candidate ensured the 
industry an easier access to the inner circle.  This can however not be directly linked to 
finance as the large number of former oil executives in the Administration might have 
made the access easier.  Nevertheless, one may assume that the sponsoring proved 
beneficial in that the candidates felt obligated to vote accordingly to their sponsors’ 
wishes or that the oil industry sponsored candidates that already shared their views and 
thus made their road to power easier.  In addition their financial resources enabled 
them to continue with scientific research and support scientific specialist who 
questioned the legitimacy of climate change.   
It may be difficult to decide on a score on the influence dimension, however it is clear 
it did not hurt the oil industry to be financially strong, and also by being able to 
sponsor ads they were able to get their views across to the public and may have 
received more support through that.  The explanatory power of the perspectives behind 
the financial strength variable may be deemed strong as it could serve as an 
explanation as to how the oil industry were able to achieve the influence they did.  
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Based on the framework explaining this variable, the oil industry was, through their 
financial strength, able to promote their views and furthermore allow them access to 
decision making arenas.  
 
Finally, public opinion turned out to have little relevance as a variable as the public 
and the oil industry differed in opinion and the oil industry was unable to change the 
minds of the public.  Though resources were spent on campaigns and media 
advertisement, it appears that few Americans turned their back on Kyoto after being 
informed of the oil industry’s opinion.  Therefore, the variable was deemed to have a 
low explanatory factor and furthermore that the potential score on the influence 
dimension would be low as the oil industry was not able to achieve influence through 
this variable. 
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Chapter 6 Comparison of Influence Before 1997 and Between 1997 and 
2001 
6.1 The different scores on the influence dimension by the oil industry 
Based on the data and discussion that took place in chapters four and five I will now 
compare the different scores on the influence dimension obtained by the oil industry in 
the different phases.  Like in the analysis, I will divide the chapter into the independent 
variables and compare the achievement of influence within these variables.   
 
6.1.1 Political mobilisation 
The oil industry has since 1994 had a great deal of access to the US Senate due to the 
Republican majority.  In chapter four it was discussed that this access to legislative 
bodies proved influential most notably due to the Byrd-Hagel resolution which made 
ratification of Kyoto difficult.  The access to decision makers in the Senate continued 
after the presidential election in 2000.  The difference was the change in 
Administration.  In 2000 the Republican presidential candidate was elected and as the 
discussion in chapter five suggested, this proved to be a favourable turn of events for 
the oil industry.  Before the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, President Bill Clinton 
favoured environmental groups to the oil industry for access to the inner circle of the 
President.  This took a complete turn in 2001 when President George W. Bush took 
office and the oil industry achieved access to the President and the Administration in 
general.  As the research in chapter five indicate, due to the fact that an extensive 
number of people in the Bush Administration had backgrounds in the fossil fuel and 
energy business, the oil industry was able to argue their positions directly to the 
President.  Although it seemed highly unlikely that the Kyoto Protocol would have 
been ratified had the presidential election had a different outcome, it is still possible to 
assume that the oil industry achieved a greater amount of influence after 1997 and that 
the score on the influence dimension was even higher.  Still, considering the strong 
objection in the Senate before the signing, the score on the dimension was also high 
before the signing, despite the fact that President Clinton denied them access to the 
presidential circle.   
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For the oil industry to achieve access to legislative bodies it may be beneficial to have 
political candidates favourable to their views elected.  Therefore the component public 
mobilisation becomes important as mobilising the public to act in a way favourable to 
the oil industry, for instance by voting for candidates supported by the oil industry, 
could increase the industry’s influence.  This way, the two components in the variable 
complete each other as one may strengthen the other.  However, it appears the oil 
industry was influential in the Senate regardless of which party was in majority and 
although one may argue that the public acted accordingly to the wishes of the oil 
industry, it is difficult to establish the explanatory factor of public mobilisation.   
The variable political mobilisation seemed thus based on the research to only achieve 
influence within one of the components and not the other.  While public mobilisation 
might have increased the influence obtained by the oil industry, it appears that it was 
of low importance in this case.  On the other hand, the public does not appear to have 
been too preoccupied on the matter and it is therefore difficult to make any fruitful 
conclusion within this component.  As a whole however, political mobilisation can be 
deemed as giving a high level of explanatory factor in the oil industry’s achievement 
of influence in both time frames. 
 
6.1.2 Unity 
The variations on the dimension unity changed between the signing and the non- 
ratification of Kyoto.  A few years before the Protocol was signed, oil industries 
started leaving the GCC and right before the Kyoto negotiations BP and Shell started 
reinventing their climate policy.  After the Protocol was signed, the GCC changed its 
membership strategy and the Pew Center with a more proactive approach to climate 
change was established and gradually gained members.  Still, regardless of a more 
proactive stance on climate change, the official view of the oil industry on Kyoto 
remained negative.  Therefore, even though the attitude amongst certain oil companies 
changed, the industry maintained the impression of a united industry in both time 
frames.  This does not however mean that the scores on the influence dimension were 
the same. It can however seem that based on the discussions in chapter four and five, 
establishing a score on the influence dimension can be difficult for both time frames.  
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Though the industry may have appeared stronger and more resourceful, it is still 
difficult to assess whether their united approach was decisive on the influence 
dimension.  It does not seem to give them a negative score, but based on the data 
presented it appears that the degree of unity proved not to be of high importance in this 
discussion.  Even if there had been official support to the Protocol, there would still 
have been strong actors within the industry who would have continued the 
mobilisation towards having Kyoto rejected and considering the most active actors in 
this discussion were also the largest one may conclude that this variable didn’t gain 
influence for the industry nor did it reduce it and though unity may help explain why 
influence was achieved, establishing a score on the influence dimension is difficult. 
 
6.1.3 Financial resources 
The financial resources of the oil industry remained the same within both time frames.  
The oil industry is one of the world’s largest industries and their financial capital 
remained large within both time frames.  It also appears that the usage of their capital 
remained the same.  The oil industry continued their media campaigns to influence 
public opinion and they were one of the largest contributors to the Bush campaign in 
2000.  This may be prove to be influential in the second time frame as the Bush victory 
enabled arena access and thus the score on the influence dimension increased.  
Considering the Bush Administration had consisting views of the oil industry 
regarding climate change and Kyoto it was perhaps not the financial strength that 
enabled the industry influence.  The long time sponsoring of the Republican Party on 
the other hand may be argued as beneficial to the oil industry gaining influence and 
this could not have been possible without their economic resources.  In chapter four it 
was argued that this was the oil industry’s most important channel for influence. There 
were also indications that the oil industry, through sponsoring of scientific research 
and known sceptics of climate change was able to raise some doubt on the issue.   By 
arguing for more research to solve an uncertain problem, they were able to prolong the 
debate and thus avoid measures like the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol to be taken.  
Based on the data and discussion presented in chapters four and five however, it can be 
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argued that the variable financial resources scores relatively high on the influence 
dimension within both time frames. 
 
6.1.4 Public opinion 
The variable public opinion remained consistent throughout the two time frames.  The 
public were in general with minor variations positive to Kyoto and to binding 
agreements reducing GHG emissions.  In addition, the public accepted the scientific 
research indicating the reality of climate change and the possibility of human induced 
climate change.  The question is thus whether this variable had any influence in any of 
the time frames?  President Clinton signed the Protocol which was in accordance with 
the public.  Despite efforts from the oil industry through advertisements and 
presentation of research contesting the authenticity of climate change, the public 
supported Kyoto. This would indicate that the oil industry would have to win over the 
public in order to succeed in their quest to not have Kyoto ratified.  This way, the 
public might influence decision makers and then the oil industry would reach its 
objective.  On the other hand, the Senate voted against the views of the public and the 
President and made the ratification of Kyoto difficult if not impossible.  This act is 
illustrative of the weak explanatory factor of the variable public opinion in the first 
phase.  In the second phase, the oil industry was not able to influence public opinion in 
any larger degree than they had earlier.  Despite media campaigns, the public opinion 
remained stable and favourable to climate change measures.  The Bush Administration 
went therefore, based on the data presented, completely against the wishes of the 
public.  The oil industry achieved influence despite the fact that the public disagreed 
with them and considering they were not able to achieve influence within this variable, 
the variable public opinion had little if any significance in this time frame.  One may 
assume that considering the views of the oil industry were different than public 
opinion and the oil industry prevailed in the second phase, the variable public opinion 
achieved a low score on the influence dimension in the last phase. 
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6.2 Synopsis of comparison 
This chapter indicates that there were few variations in the influence obtained by the 
oil industry in the two time frames.  This assumption is based on the similar results in 
the discussion of the independent variables.  Variables that scored high on dimensions 
in one time frame, scored high on the other as well.  The main difference may perhaps 
be within the variable unity where it can be argued that unity was reduced in the 
second time frame.  Access to the decision making arena improved in the second time 
frame, and thus it may be assumed that the influence of the oil industry within this 
variable, although strong before 1997, was stronger between the signing and the 
decision not to ratify Kyoto.  Based on the discussions in chapters four and five and 
the comparison in this chapter, the two time phases proved to be fruitful for 
comparison and shared many of the same results. 
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Chapter 7: Concluding Remarks 
In this study I have presented the American oil industry and based on empirical data 
with the help of theoretical framework I have discussed the variation in the influence 
dimension for the oil industry with regard to the Clinton Administration’s decision to 
sign the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and the Bush Administration’s decision not to ratify 
the Protocol in 2001.  The different components were explored and measured and 
ultimately the two different time frames were compared in chapter six.  In this chapter 
I will first discuss the theories and independent variables, their strengths, weaknesses 
and potential overlaps between the variables.  Then I will discuss the empirical 
findings where I will consider the research question and whether I was able to answer 
it. I will also discuss the strengths and weaknesses with the data than I collected.  In 
conclusion I will briefly comment on the future of the Kyoto Protocol in the US and 
what lies ahead for the oil industry. 
 
7.1 Theoretical findings 
The independent variables were developed to help explain the data collected and to 
give a better description of how the dependent variable influence could be obtained.  
They were discussed separately and potential relations between the variables were not 
explored due to an assumption of their independent effects as well as to limit the study.  
The discussions in chapter five and six indicate that there was at times coherence 
between the variables and sometimes the variables could have had an impact on each 
other.  For instance the variable political mobilisation includes public mobilisation, 
and this component could be closely linked to public opinion.  On the other hand they 
measured different aspects as public mobilisation measures the actions while public 
opinion measures the opinion of the public and what their views were.  Therefore they 
did have independent impacts although they occasionally overlapped as the oil 
industry could use the same means to achieve influence in both variables.  For instance 
could a media campaign result in a stronger score on the public opinion variable as 
they were informed with and consented to the views of the oil industry, while this 
opinion could have led to action and thus give a higher score in the component public 
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mobilisation and thus the political mobilisation variable.  Financial resources and the 
component arena access proved to be of help to each other.  The oil industry needed 
financial resources to support political campaigns to gain access to the decision 
making arena.  Had it not been for their economic strength, it would have been 
difficult to conduct independent research, sponsor politicians, establish and support 
think tanks and achieve the expertise in lobbying which can be argued as being 
beneficial for the industry.  It is of course possible to achieve access without financial 
resources, but they are beneficial and lack of financial resources would have made it 
more difficult for the oil industry to achieve influence.  The variables financial 
resources and public opinion may also have had an impact on each other.  Financial 
resources may have enabled media campaigns which again may have influenced the 
public opinion.  Nevertheless these variables worked independently and all offered 
independent explanations on why the oil industry achieved their goal with denying 
Kyoto ratification. 
 
7.1.1 The explanatory power of the independent variables  
The explanatory factors were strong with some of the variables and weak with others. 
In the first time frame the first variable political mobilisation had, based on the 
discussion presented in chapter four, a strong explanatory power for the component 
arena access and slightly lower for public mobilisation.  The reason for this assessment 
is the fact that the oil industry achieved access in the decision making arena due to the 
Republican Party gaining majority in both houses of Congress in 1994 and considering 
the ExxonMobil and API sponsored the Party, it gave them influence.  This would not 
have been possible had it not been for the public voting the way they did.  On the other 
hand, it is difficult to establish the reasons for the public voting.  The election in 1994 
could just as well been caused by a disappointment in the Clinton Administration, or 
the focus on other issues.  Therefore, the explanatory power of this component is 
difficult to establish.  In 1996, Clinton was re-elected and thus the oil industry was not 
successful in having a Republican candidate be elected president.  This could have 
been caused by other external factors such as other issues in the presidential campaign 
being for more importance.  Therefore it is difficult to establish whether the outcome 
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was a result of the oil industry’s influence.  In any case, the industry had been able to 
prevent the BTU tax in a Democratic controlled Senate and the question is thus 
whether they would have needed the Republican victory.  Also, Byrd-Hagel achieved a 
unanimous approval and thus it would appear that a Republican majority might not 
have had a large effect.  The oil industry was argued to have been instrumental in 
shaping US climate policy, something that indicates influence.  Despite their influence 
in the Senate, the oil industry could not prevent Kyoto from being signed but they had 
already made it extremely difficult for the Protocol to be ratified and thus the 
explanatory power for legislative bodies and arena access is strong.  
As the comparison in chapter six indicated there were several similarities with the 
explanatory power of the independent variables in the two discussions.  The variable 
political mobilisation was strong in both; however it can be argued that it was even 
stronger in the second time frame as access to the president was achieved as a 
Republican president was elected.  Therefore, one could argue that the public had been 
mobilised to vote accordingly to the views of the oil industry and furthermore access 
was through this achieved.  It does however appear to be a result of other factors and 
therefore this component had low explanatory power.  Still, the two components in the 
variable completed each other to some extent in both time frames and enabled a 
stronger independent variable. 
 
The industry was united in the first time frame, though BP had changed their policy 
just before the Kyoto negotiations and left GCC.  The American oil industry however, 
remained united before the signing.  The explanatory power on the other hand was 
difficult to establish. Though it is likely that the industry appeared stronger, the effects 
of them being united may not have been that large.  However, the GCC and API 
consist of many fossil fuel companies and thus the industry was united within these 
two groups.  By being allied in the GCC who was the strongest advocate for putting an 
end to Kyoto, the industry did seem stronger and it is possible to assume that unity led 
to influence.    
The variable unity appears to have less explanatory power in the second time frame.  
This is due to several large companies leaving the GCC, not just the European like 
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Shell and BP but also Texaco and Chevron.  Therefore the measuring of influence 
proved problematic within this variable as the industry divided into several groups.  
Although many remained in API, many also joined the Pew Center which had a more 
proactive stance on climate change.  Nevertheless, the Pew Center was also against 
Kyoto and therefore it appears that most of the American oil companies were against 
the Protocol.  Still, it seems as though the opposition with some weakened and 
establishing the score on the influence dimension remained difficult. 
 
Financial resources were undoubtedly strong in both time frames and their economic 
strength enabled actions such as sponsoring of both political and media campaigns, 
and thus access was achieved.  Additionally they could establish their own research 
contradicting what opposing opinions were presenting.  By hiring experts who would 
be more positive to the oil industry’s opinions on climate change rather than the green 
movement and the Clinton Administration they could present a more moderate view 
on climate change and question it’s authenticity to the policy makers and the public.  
This would not have been possible to the same extent without the financial resources. 
In the second time frame the oil industry continued to sponsor the Republican Party, 
independent research and media campaigns like before.  Therefore the possibility of 
achieving influence remained the same here. 
 
The final variable public opinion received a low score on the influence dimension in 
the first time frame and its explanatory power was not strong.  This is because the 
American public were favourable to Kyoto and the oil industry was within this time 
frame not able to change their minds.  Furthermore, considering the public were in 
favour and the Protocol was signed, one may assume that the oil industry achieved no 
influence within this variable and thus had to achieve it elsewhere.   
Public opinion suffered the same outcome in the second time frame.  Regardless of the 
oil industry’s attempts, the public still favoured the Kyoto Protocol and accepted the 
idea of human induced climate change.  The only difference here is that decision 
makers did not take the public opinion into consideration when deciding to not ratify 
the Protocol and thus the variable was even weaker in this phase. 
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One may thus conclude the data presented above and in chapters four and five as 
follows.  The variable political mobilisation indicates that arena access was 
determinative for the potential influence obtained by the oil industry in both time 
frames.  Public mobilisation had a slightly weaker effect as it is difficult to establish 
the reasons for the public’s voting, and considering no large demonstrations or public 
campaigns were made to fight for signing of Kyoto, it is possible this component had a 
weaker effect than the other component in the variable.  Still, the variable as a whole 
had strong explanatory power.   
The oil industry maintained a united stance against Kyoto in both time frames despite 
a more proactive approach by certain companies.  The score on the influence 
dimension was difficult to measure as establishing an increase in influence due to 
unity was difficult.   
Financial resources were of help to be able to make some of the above mentioned 
variables come true. One may thus question the independent effect the variable had, as 
finance alone might not give the oil industry influence.  On the other hand, they would 
not have been able to achieve what they did without it and thus it had explanatory 
power. 
Finally one may conclude that the variable public opinion had little explanatory power 
and scored low in the influence dimension as the oil industry was not able to achieve 
influence within this variable. 
 
7.2 Empirical findings 
Based on the data presented and the research done one may conclude that the oil 
industry was influential in the decision to not ratify the Kyoto Protocol.  Even though 
they were unsuccessful in preventing the Protocol to be signed, considering their allies 
in the Senate and the unanimous passing of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, the oil industry 
knew that Kyoto would be dead on arrival in the Senate regardless which party was in 
majority.  This is why they never needed to create a back up plan as they were quite 
sure Kyoto would never be ratified.  It also appears that President Clinton was aware 
of this fact and that is maybe why he did not push for ratification during his 
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presidency.  It would appear that the oil industry had no need to continue their 
lobbying efforts, but in any case, the industry continued to lobby to deny ratification 
for Kyoto and in the end their efforts paid off. 
 
7.2.1 The research question 
In chapter one I posed the following question; “demonstrate to what extent and how 
the American oil industry sought to influence the US decision first to sign and then not 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol?”   
The oil industry embarked early on a strategy to prevent Kyoto ratification.  This 
strategy included intense lobbying in the decision making arena, media campaigns and 
advertising and sponsoring of political candidates as well as conducting their own 
research on the issue on climate change.  It seems clear that the oil industry was 
actively involved and that they deliberately sought to influence policy makers in order 
to reach their objective.  As the outcome was beneficial to the oil industry it would be 
of interest to discuss the level of influence achieved by the industry.  Based on the 
discussions taken place in the study one may conclude that the oil industry, although 
unable to prevent the signing, was influential in the decision not to ratify Kyoto.  The 
reason for this conclusion is the access the industry had to decision makers and their 
role in having the Byrd-Hagel resolution passed. There are other potential explanations 
for the result which I will not explore further here, but regardless of other actors and 
explanatory factors, it does appear that the oil industry had influence on this matter.  
 
Based on the discussion and the conclusions made above the research question was to 
a large extent answered.  The industry did try to influence the decisions and the 
variables I selected were explanatory and were able to shed light on the possible 
actions taken by the industry to achieve influence. Though not all variables were 
equally explanatory as presented in 7.1, it was still sufficient to gain an idea on how 
the industry acted and how they worked to achieve influence. 
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7.2.2 Data 
The collecting of data proved to be a challenge due to the extent of secondary sources 
in addition to primary sources.  The secondary sources had to be verified at all times to 
be assured of its validity.  The potential problems that one could have been faced with 
in this study were problems with misinterpretations and wrongful data in the sources.  
The views of the authors could be coloured and therefore the data given would not be 
correct.  This was not just for data concerning the oil industry but also for the 
counterbalancing forces who were interested in shedding a different light on the issue.  
Therefore, other sources who could verify the data had to be found in order to present 
it in the study. 
 
Other problems with data were polls and not being able to compare them as they were 
done in different time spaces and by different companies.  Also, the findings in these 
polls could not be stated as facts but could be used as tools to give indications on how 
the public felt. 
 
There was a great deal of research done on this matter, perhaps more so on the second 
phase than the first.  However, finding material to explain the influence of the industry 
was not difficult as there had been conducted studies on the matter and also the media 
had covered the case to some degree.  Therefore, along with the theoretical 
perspectives, the data helped answer the research question. 
 
7.3 Final remarks 
What is in store for the Kyoto Protocol?  In the US the answer is most likely that it is 
dead and buried for a foreseeable future.  There are small chances that President Bush 
will push for ratification during his presidency and therefore it seems as though the 
Kyoto Protocol will go on without the US on board.  The consequence of the US 
decision not to ratify the Protocol was perhaps not as great as expected by international 
actors and environmental groups and the Protocol is still alive today. 
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As for the US, voluntary measures are being discussed.  New legislation which calls 
for reductions of CO2 emissions has been introduced to the Senate.  At this time it 
appears it will be difficult to have environmental bills of this kind passed by the 
Senate.  However there is an increasing congressional interest in the matter and 
considering that the US is the largest emitters of GHG in the world, one would hope 
they reach an agreement internally to be able to reduce the emissions.  In light of 
recent events the last year, devastating hurricanes and tornadoes, one may assume that 
the focus may shift in the direction of mandatory measures and maybe the US will 
politically and internationally realise the seriousness of climate change.  It appears the 
citizens of the US have made this realisation and thus politicians should hopefully 
want to follow 
 
As for the oil industry, API and ExxonMobil continue to be reactive.  There are 
indications towards a slightly greener profile within ExxonMobil and an increased 
willingness to have an open mind on the issue of climate change.  Still, they maintain 
their scepticism and are not likely to become green over night.  However, in order to 
keep up with the research and mentality of the European companies which are 
investing in environmental friendlier options to fossil fuel, Exxon might have to 
change its strategy in order to be up to date with other companies and not lose out 
when the demand for alternative to fossil fuel increases.   
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